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ABSTRACT
A Model of Presidential Power Adjustment 
During Wartime: “How Curious George 
Went to Washington and has Been 
Detained Ever Since”
by
Joseph Szewczyk
Dr. Jerry Simich, Committee Chair 
Professor of Political Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
The President’s power is in a state of constant flux. During times of war, 
the President is allowed an expanse of power normally not available during times 
of peace. After the war ends or becomes too unpopular, the President 
relinquishes the power gained. This effect, labeled in the thesis as “Expansion 
and Constriction”, has occurred in the major war eras of the past and is 
predictable. It is the focus of this thesis to show the existence of the pattern and 
to use the pattern to discuss the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA 
PATRIOT Act) and its use in the war on terror. This information is useful 
because it will demonstrate what is needed to allow the President to exercise the 
power given, and what is needed to take away the power given by the USA 
PATRIOT Act.
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To deliver the goal of showing the pattern exists and can be applied to the 
USA PATRIOT era, the thesis is broken up into two parts. The first part of the 
thesis will view key cases in the Civil War, World War I, World War II and Korean 
War eras. The war eras and their cases will be discussed in terms of the 
“expansion and constriction” pattern. After showing that a pattern exists, the 
second part of the thesis focuses on the USA PATRIOT Act era and if the pattern 
can be used to predict the outcome of this era. At the end of the thesis, solutions 
will be suggested that can benefit both the opponents and the supporters of the 
USA PATRIOT Act.
IV
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION OF THE MODEL 
There is a pattern of strengthening of presidential powers during times of 
crisis. During crisis the office of the President is granted, through creation of 
vague laws and the silence of the Court, an expanded application of power. After 
the crisis is over the President's powers constrict due to court rulings or acts of 
Congress. During the war, the need to protect the citizens of the United States is 
more valuable than the need to protect their civil liberties; the President gains 
power. As the war comes to a close, and the federal courts become involved, 
the need to protect the citizen’s civil liberties becomes more valuable than the 
need to protect the civilians themselves; the President has his power readjusted 
to near pre-wartime levels. This is the effect that this thesis defines as 
“expansion and contraction”. The President ultimately does not gain or lose 
power but his ability is affected in a near cyclical pattern.
This pattern of change in presidential power during crisis is important 
because through it the model of “expansion and constriction” is created. The 
model may then be used, with precedence, in the present to predict the outcome 
of the USA PATRIOT era.
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History and the current issue 
“ In a word, history sufficiently informs us that penal laws have never had any 
other effect than to destroy.” (Montesquieu, 1752, section 12) Although 
Montesquieu never saw the devastation left by the attacks on 9-11, nor did he 
witness the response of the United States government to those attacks, the 
quote he gave can serve as a cry of every organization, group or individual 
citizen’s lament for freedom. This thesis shall look at the effects that the post 9- 
11 legislation of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) has on 
the privacy of individuals and the freedoms enjoyed. The United States 
government’s argument for the expanded powers of the government through the 
USA PATRIOT Act is based on a counter-terrorism measure. The question 
raised by the opponents of the act is whether the USA PATRIOT power is being 
abused by the government at the cost of civil liberties.
At the front of the issue there are two groups. The first group comes from 
the President’s office and law enforcement agencies seeking more power, or to 
keep the USA PATRIOT Aot power that they enjoy. The second group comes in 
the form of interest groups, citizens, and towns that believe the Act was passed 
in haste and at a time of mourning.
The first group still maintains there is much need for the powers of the 
USA PATRIOT Act and that it will be used only against terrorists and never 
against the good citizens of America. The United States government 
demonstrated terrorist and criminal cases that would not have been if not for the
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USA PATRIOT Act. Interviews given by agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and non-federal law officials, have shown that, not only did the 
USA PATRIOT Act help in new cases being developed, but it also gave older 
cases sufficient evidence to move forward. In more than one instance a law 
enforcement official has stated that a case that had received high public outcry in 
the past would have been better understood if the different law-enforcement 
agencies were able to share information as they can now under the new 
provisions given by the USA PATRIOT Act.
The second group believes that the USA PATRIOT Act is a severe threat 
to civil liberties. (“Patriot Revolution”, 2004) This group believes that the USA 
PATRIOT Act was passed too quickly and that the powers of the Act are 
overbroad.
The American Civil Liberties Union (AGLU) has commented that the “most 
troublesome” parts (of the Act) are as following:
1) Indefinite detention of non-citizens who have not been 
shown to be terrorists on minor visa violations if they 
cannot be deported because they are stateless, their 
country of origin refuses to accept them or because they 
would face torture in their country of origin.
2) Minimized judicial supervision of federal telephone and 
internet surveillance by law enforcement authorities.
3) Expanded ability of the government to conduct secret 
searches.
4) Gave the Attorney General and the Secretary of State 
the power to designate domestic groups as terrorist 
organizations and deport any non-citizen who belongs to 
them.
5) Granted the FBI broad access to sensitive business 
records about individuals without having to show 
evidence of a crime.
6) Lead to large-scale investigations of American citizens 
for "intelligence" purposes.” (“AGLU Legislative” , 2003)
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The main issue seems to be whether the United States is willing to pay a 
high price for the security of its citizens. The price, according to the second 
position, is the freedom of those very citizens the first position protects. There 
have been times in United States history that the freedom of citizens had been 
overruled by the need for national security. The Civil War and the time around 
both of the world wars have been such occasions. In brief, one can look to 
President Abraham Lincoln’s message to Congress on July 4, 1861, “Are all the 
laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself to go to pieces, lest 
that one be violated?” (Lincoln, 1861, as cited by Rehnquist, 1988, p. 72) The 
distance between President Lincoln’s words and need for the words of the USA 
PATRIOT Act seems to be the main concern of both groups. If a model can be 
formed that can predict the outcome of the USA PATRIOT Act then the sides, 
either for or against the Act, will have a blueprint upon which they can base their 
strategy.
Defining the research problem 
The scope of this thesis is to show a pattern which can be used to predict 
the outcome of presidential powers at the time of a war era. The pattern shall 
show the “expansion and constriction” effect of presidential powers, and it will be 
consistent through time. To do this, the pattern is defined with its parts so that it 
may be applied throughout this thesis.
The descriptive model of the “expansion and constriction” shows the effect 
that crisis has on presidential power, the increase of the power and the eventual
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
readjustment of the power. The model relies on several components to 
accurately predict the near cycle of power during a time of crisis.
The components are;
The Crisis Itself
Power Given to the President
The Silence of the Courts
The Use of the Power Given to the President
Attack on Constitutional Rights of United States residents
Complaint Filed at a Federal Court Level
The Crisis on the Downswing
Federal Court Involvement
Readjustment of Power to President to a Lower Level.
The components of the 
model in detail
To begin the “expansion and constriction” effect there has to be a crisis 
introduced into the American political system. Crisis, for the scope of this thesis, 
is defined as a conventional war. A conventional war has sides based on 
national allegiances and is carried out in the boundaries of the nations at war, 
due to the war’s physical limitations there can be a winner. Without a crisis the 
model would not have its catalyst.
The crisis brings a wider berth of power to the President. New laws are 
passed, or executive commands are issued, that were not in place before the 
crisis occurred. It is in this time that the President not only applies his power 
abroad, but also at home in reaction to or prevention of attacks on domestic soil.
During the time when the President’s power increases, the federal courts 
are silent. The courts do not hear cases that question the authority of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
President. This allows the President to use the new power to its highest degree 
since the court system, which provides a constitutional check, is silent.
The President then uses the new power to safeguard the United States 
against foreign threats. Since the crisis is still fresh, it is at this time that the need 
for civil protection outweighs the need for civil liberty.
In ensuring the safety of the United States, the President enforces laws or 
rules that would be seen as an attack on constitutional rights of United States 
residents if done in times other than crisis. In this time, groups of residents are 
labeled the enemy due to being associated with the nation the United States 
would be at war with.
As the crisis continues, the residents of the United States, who were 
singled out by the enforcement of the new laws, take issue with the law to the 
United States Supreme Court (USSC). This action forces the Court to break its 
silence and become involved. During this time the immediate crisis is no longer 
as pressing as it once was.
The result is the readjustment of the President’s power. The President 
does not lose power, but only has the constriction of power to a point similar to 
the position it was before the crisis occurred. There are residuals of power that 
do remain and become a base upon future increases of power can be built.
As the following figure (Figure 1) shows, the “Expansion and Constriction” 
Model is indeed near circular with its beginning and ending with Presidential 
Power.
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Figure 1. Chart of the “Expansion and Constriction” Model
Method used to apply the model to the 
USA PARTIOT Act 
To apply the model to the USA PATRIOT Act, a special pattern must first 
exist. To show that this pattern exists, the model will be applied to cases from 
the Civil War era to the Korean War era. This will show the precedent of the 
model and its use to explain the issues brought forth by each time of crisis.
After showing that the model is valid, it will then be applied to the case of 
the USA PATRIOT Act in expectation that the future of the Act can be predicted 
by the model. If the model cannot be applied to the case of the USA PATRIOT 
Act then a reason of either uniqueness of the Act, or something missing within 
the model, shall be given.
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Outline of the thesis
Chapter Two discusses cases from the Civil War era, such as the Prize 
Cases to the Korean War era case of Youngstown Sheet and Tube v Sawyer. 
The discussion starts with each particular case background and decision. From 
the United States Supreme Court case rulings, along with the history of the case, 
a pattern of "expansion and constriction” will occur.
Chapter Three takes a section-by-section look at the USA PATRIOT Act. 
Starting with a time-line of the creation of the Act, a discussion on just what the 
Aot entails is given. Applications on how the Act is being used are provided. The 
government states cases that it required to establish the Act and the groups 
opposed to the Act. state instances where they believe the Act was being abused 
by the authorities. Finally, the chapter concludes with cases brought against the 
government trying to get the USA PATRIOT Act repealed, along with a list of 
communities that have passed legislation that nullifies parts of the USA 
PATRIOT Act.
Chapter Four is the conclusion of the work. This chapter will show that the 
“expansion and constriction” pattern does indeed exist, with examples of the 
past, and that it can be applied to the current situation of the USA PATRIOT Act. 
With the precedent of pattern shown in the previous chapter, the model will then 
be fitted to the USA PATRIOT Act; a prediction can then be made based upon 
the model.
8
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CHAPTER 2
THE APPLICATION OF THE MODEL 
To determine if the “Expansion and Constriction” Model exists it has to be 
applied in its components to a time of war. For this thesis four separate periods 
of war have been selected: Civil War era, World War I era, World War II era, and 
Korean War era. These four periods will be introduced by when the war started, 
then specific USSC Cases are discussed that show use of power given to the 
President due to that war, followed by when the war had ended and how the 
power of the President was constricted. It is predicted that a pattern will emerge 
in all of the war eras.
The Presidency Pre-Civil War era 
The President is the representative of the executive branch of the United 
States. The earliest form of an American executive power was found in the 
governor of the royal province. The powers of such a governor included 
appointment, military command, expenditure, pardons and a large 
connection to law making. (Corwin, 1957)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The President is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. He can grant 
pardons, make treaties, appoint public officials, including United States Supreme 
Court justices, with the consent of Congress, and fill temporary vacancies while 
Congress is not available to give consent. (United States Constitution. Article II, 
Section 2)
For the focus of the pre-Civil War era, only the President as the 
Commander-in-Chief and the President as the Organ of Foreign Affairs is 
important. With the lack of definition of foreign affairs in the Constitution, the 
President encounters a wide berth of power. The President is limited only by 
direct acts of Congress or intervention of the United States Supreme Court. In 
history, the United States Supreme Court has declined to mold the powers of the 
President due to the claim that the United States Supreme Court lacks both 
authority and expertise. There is, however, a struggle between the President 
and Congress.
In 1793, President George Washington issued the Proclamation of 
Neutrality in regards to the fighting between France and Great Britain. This 
caused a stir with James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, who stated that the 
power to declare war was for Congress and a proclamation of neutrality was akin 
to a proclamation of war. Alexander Hamilton, as Pacificus, wrote in defense of 
President Washington. (Kommers and Finn, 2004) The response President 
Washington gave to the situation was one that framed the incident for the 
Executive, saying that he “would be damned if he would be found in that place
10
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(the Senate) again...” (Washington, 1793, as cited by Feeley and Krislov, 1990, 
p.172)
Thomas Jefferson would later run into a situation with the purchase of the 
Louisiana Territory in 1803. President Thomas Jefferson was worried that he did 
not have the authority under the Constitution to purchase the land, even with the 
mention of the power of making treaties and being the Organ of Foreign 
Relations. President Jefferson’s response was to draft a constitutional 
amendment that would validate his purchase after the purchase had already 
taken place. President Jefferson would later stop work on the further drafting of 
the amendment as he decided that he had the power to purchase the land due to 
his role as protector of the Union. (Krommers and Finn, 2004) He wrote in a 
letter to J.B. Colvin an explanation, “a strict observance of the written laws is 
doubtless one of the highest duties of a good citizen, but is not the highest...the 
laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are 
of higher obligation; a strict and rigid observation of the laws (in some cases) 
may do harm.” (Jefferson, 1810, p. 1)
The Civil War era
Although the Confederate States of America was formed with Robert E. 
Lee as its president on February 9, 1861, the Civil War itself did not start until the 
first shots were fired by the Confederate Army on February 12, 1861 at Fort 
Sumter, in Charleston, South Carolina. (Civilwar.com, 2004)
11
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On May 25, 1861, shortly after President Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of 
habeas corpus, John Merryman was found in his home by federal troops and 
arrested. He was charged with the destruction of railroad bridges after the 
Baltimore riot of April 19 of the same year.
Merryman, well known in the community and also a state legislator, 
immediately obtained counsel on Saturday and sought a writ of habeas corpus. 
The next day. Chief Justice Roger Taney read the petition, and the writ was 
issued on Monday. The writ was addressed to General George Cadwalader, the 
commander of the military district in which Merryman resided. Colonel Henry 
Lee responded to the call of the Court for Ex Parte Merryman (1861) in place of 
General Cadwalader. Lee then gave a brief summary of the charges brought up 
against Merryman and reminded the Court that upon authorization of the 
President, Cadwalader had the authority to suspend habeas corpus for the good 
of the public. Due to neither Cadwalader nor Merryman being produced, the 
Court issued they were to appear the next day no later than twelve noon. 
(Rehnquist, 1998)
On May 28*  ^ 1861, the Chief Justice asked the marshal if he served notice 
to appear. The reply was that the marshal did go to the fort to serve the writ but 
was not answered when he announced himself at the gate. (Rehnquist, 1998) 
Taney then issued this statement from the bench,
I ordered the attachment yesterday, because upon the face of the return of 
the detention of the prisoner was unlawful upon two grounds. The 
President under the Constitution and laws of the Unties Sates, cannot 
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, nor authorize any 
military officer to do so. A military officer has no right to arrest a person, 
not subject to the rules and articles of war, for an offense against the laws
12
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of the United States, except in and of juridical authority and subject to its 
control-and if the parties arrested by the military-it is the duty of the officer 
to deliver him over immediately to the civil authority, to be dealt with 
according to the law. (Baltimore American, 1861, p. 2)
Taney then told the marshal that he had the legal authority to form a
posse to bring in the General. The marshal knew that he would be greatly
outnumbered if he were to go to the gates, therefore, he declined. Taney then
said he would write a conclusion of the opinion and send it to Lincoln for his
action to enforce the laws.
President Lincoln never responded directly to Taney’s words, but rather
made a speech to Congress pointing out that the Constitution was silent on
which branch of government had the power to suspend habeas corpus and
stated that he believed, when emergency rose and Congress was not in session,
that the power lies within the presidency. Lincoln indirectly addressed Taney
during his speech to Congress, when he stated that what Taney wanted would
allow, “all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to
pieces, lest that very one be violated.” (Lincoln, 1861, as cited by Rehnquist,
1998, p. 72)
Merryman was kept imprisoned at Fort McHenry and was indicted for 
conspiracy to commit treason. He was then admitted to bail while Taney kept 
saying that as long as the civil courts were open and functioning, the military 
courts should not be able to try civilians. The Lincoln administration ignored 
Taney, but Merryman was freed on bail in the summer of 1861 and was never 
brought to trial for his charges. This was one of many cases that had similar 
indictments for treason but no prosecution during the Civil War period. Although
13
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Merryman was never tried, the presidency had gained power and shown it by 
ignoring the courts. (Rehnquist, 1998) As Clinton Rossiter said, “The most a 
court or judge can do is read the President a lecture.” (Rossiter, 1987, as cited in 
Biskupic and Witt, 1997. p.120)
While President Lincoln suspended habeas corpus, the Civil War was at a 
crucial point. When the Court ruled against Lincoln’s use of martial rule he 
ignored the Court’s decision entirely. This act of disobedience by President 
Lincoln is shown in the model as the action of constriction remains unclear due to 
the war still being active.
Before President Lincoln was inaugurated on March 4, 1861, seven 
southern states seceded from the Union. In mid-April, after shots were fired at 
Fort Sumter, Lincoln instituted a naval blockade of southern ports. Due to 
Congress being out of session, the blockade was accomplished without 
Congressional consent. (Epstein and Walker, 2001) During this time four 
different ships were caught in the harbor and seized as part of the blockade. 
From the act of taking ships as “prizes” as regulated during the blockade, the 
Prize Cases (Prize Cases, 1863) gain their name.
During the blockade, the Amy Warwick was en route to Richmond and 
was held because it was one of the enemies’ property. The Hiawatha was a 
British ship that failed to leave port after a warning was given to all neutral ships 
to leave in fifteen days. The ship could not find a tow-ship and was then seized 
after the fifteen days expired. The Brilliante was a Mexican ship that entered 
New Orleans over a month after the blockade was in place; it was captured while
14
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trying to leave New Orleans. A Richmond owned trading ship, the Crenshaw, 
was seized trying to trade tobacco with England. The courts upheld all four 
seizers. The question remained, however, did the President indeed have the 
authority to declare the blockade without the immediate consent of Congress. 
(Hall, 1992) It is this question that the Prize Cases (1863) were based upon.
When Congress met in session on July 1861, they passed a measure that 
declared a state of war did indeed exist and authorized the closing of the 
southern ports. On August 6, 1861, Congress went further to cover Lincoln by 
passing a resolution that stated that all of the acts Lincoln did with respects to the 
Army, Navy and militias were retrospectively approved and made valid, as if 
Congress issued the orders. (Biskupic and Witt, 1997, p. 82)
In a 5-4 vote the United States Supreme Court upheld the seizure of the 
ships without immediate congressional action due to the powers the President 
has during emergency to uphold the peace and security of the nation. Justice 
Robert Grier wrote the majority opinion. In the opinion he summarizes, “The 
President was bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself, without waiting for 
Congress to baptize it with a name...Whether the President is fulfilling his duties, 
as Commander-in-Chief, in suppressing an insurrection, has met with such 
armed hostile resistance, and a civil war of such alarming proportions as will 
compel him to accord to them the character of belligerents, is a question to be 
decided by him, and this court must be governed by the decisions and acts of the 
Political Department of the government to which this power was entrusted.” 
(Grier, 1863, pp. 2-3)
15
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In dissent, Justices Roger Taney, Samuel Nelson, John Catron, and 
Nathan Clifford focused on the fact that Lincoln did not have the ability to declare 
war under the Constitution and therefore could not institute a blockade. Nelson 
wrote in the dissent the he believed there could be no war between the federal 
government, and the state in insurrection, until it is declared by Congress. Since 
Lincoln did not have the right to declare war, he did not have the right to issue a 
blockade. (Nelson, 1863)
The dissenting faction of the Prize Cases stated that only Congress could 
declare war, and they continued to state that the ships and cargo to be illegally 
held. This case was decided on the majority’s opinion that the government could 
treat an insurrection as if war itself had been formally declared and it was the 
President himself that contained the power of Commander-in-Chief. (Rehnquist, 
1998)
The Prize Cases show if the President acts outside of the direct power of 
the Constitution, the action is allowed by the Supreme Court when the action is 
backed up by Congress. This introduces Congress as an outside force that can 
help the action of the model along. With the support of Congress, the President’s 
power is almost beyond question. This adds to the part of the model where the 
Courts are undecided. The vote in the case was close and the Court could not 
decide unanimously on how the issue should have been resolved.
In 1863, Clement Vallandigham was arrested in his home during the 
middle of the night. His offense was the charge of breaking General Order #38, 
an order given by General Ambrose Burnside. (Rehnquist, 1998) General Order
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#38 stated that it was unlawful for anyone to declare sympathies with the enemy. 
If someone were to commit and offense against the order, then he or she would 
be arrested at once, tried in a tribunal with the possibility of being executed or 
sent over enemy lines. (Scott, 1972) This order was given to quiet any dissent 
that may occur from the institution of a draft into the army of the North.
On April 30th, Vallandigham spoke before a Democratic rally in Columbus, 
Ohio. He did so to defend the right of assembly and the freedom of speech to 
discuss the current state of government. He attaoked General Order #38 on the 
grounds of the limitations of liberty and that normal citizens could not be tried 
under military tribunal, as was stated in General Order #38.
After his assembly speech, Vallandigham gave another the following day 
more directly at the expense of General Order #38. Burnside had spies sent to 
this speech and they reported the news back to him. Later that evening, 
Burnside ordered the arrest of Vallandigham. Two hours after midnight on May 
5, a special train arrived in Dayton, Ohio, on board was Captain Charles G. 
Hutton, along with a company of sixty-seven men. Hutton and company 
surrounded Vallandigham's house, and after they were refused entrance, the 
company broke the back door down. In less than one day the military tribunal 
began.
Vallandigham was charged with breaking General Order #38 due to his 
speech that called the war an unjust war. After refusing to enter a plea, a plea of 
"not-guilty" was entered for him. After the two spies testified that Vallandigham 
gave the speech, he had one witness in his defense and his own testimony. The
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tribunal called for deliberation and came back with a verdict of guilty. It is 
important to note that the entire military tribunal was made entirely of Burnside's 
subordinates.
Two days later, Vallandigham's attorney sought a writ of habeas corpus 
and the result was a ruling in favor of the government. The sentence for 
Vallandigham was for his imprisonment for the entire term of the Civil War. 
President Lincoln, upon hearing of the decision, faced a difficult task. He could 
either overturn the decision entirely or he could modify the sentencing while 
keeping the conviction. President Lincoln appeared to want to overturn the 
decision entirely and even stated that, if it were times of peace, Vallandigham 
would not have been tried in a military tribunal at all. However, those were not 
times of peace. President Lincoln could not simply overturn the sentence unless 
he wanted to also overturn the power given through martial rule. When asked for 
an explanation of why the charge of guilty had to remain. President Lincoln 
replied, "Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts while I must not 
touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert?" (Lincoln, 1863) 
President Lincoln did, however, change the sentencing from imprisonment to 
banishment beyond the Union lines. Later, Vallandigham would come back to 
Ohio and would be ignored by the government for having done so. (Rehnquist, 
1998)
The action of the Civil War gave President Lincoln the power to suspend 
habeas corpus. Congress was not in session at the time and no immediate 
action was taken on their part. For this particular case the order of martial rule
18
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
was vested in a military commander. This shows that even when the President 
gains the power, he may delegate the power as he sees fit. Even when the 
President was having second thoughts on whether to follow up on this particular 
case, he kept his course knowing that if he did pardon in this case, he would lose 
the power to declare martial rule. This shows the need of the war’s closing or 
becoming too unpopular to be sustained for constriction to occur.
The Civil War was a war where the enemy could very well have been 
someone you knew. The familiarity of the enemy in the Civil War lent itself to 
making sympathies for the enemy in either camp. There were some in the 
bordering northern states, Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, and Mississippi, that did not join 
the Confederate Army but held sympathy with the army and the people who 
made up that army. President Lincoln was faced with the decision of keeping 
individual liberty intact or to secure the safety of the Union. Choosing the safety 
of the Union, President Lincoln gave broad sweeping powers to his military 
commanders so that they could arrest or detain any civilian that they thought 
might be engaged in a wide definition of traitorous activity. The citizens were 
then to be tried in military court instead of civilian court.
The sweeping authority was not limited to those areas that the South 
controlled, but also where the Union controlled. To do this. President Lincoln had 
to declare martial law and suspend habeas corpus. In doing this. President 
Lincoln ignored the Constitution, which put the suspension of habeas corpus in 
the power of the Legislature, not the Executive, and only when civilian courts 
could not safely be held. Even after Congress later declared that everything that
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President Lincoln did on his own was also the will of Congress, there still 
remained the fact that civilian courts were running and therefore, civilian trials 
should have taken place in those courts instead of the military tribunals. (Epstein 
& Walker, 2004)
Lambdin Milligan was an attorney in the North and had sympathies with 
the South. He did not join the Confederate Army, but he did join the “Sons of 
Liberty”, which was a group dedicated to freeing Confederate prisoners held in 
Union prisons. Milligan was arrested by federal troops in October 1864 and tried 
in a military tribunal. He was found guilty of treason and sentenced to hang until 
dead. President Andrew Johnson commuted Milligan’s death sentence to one of 
life imprisonment. Milligan’s attorney asked the federal courts for a writ of 
habeas corpus, even though he knew that President Lincoln had suspended 
habeas corpus during the time of the trespass by Milligan. The case reached the 
United States Supreme Court in 1866; one year after the Civil War had ended. 
(Krommers & Finn, 2004)
In Ex Parte Milligan (1866) the counsel for Milligan provided a defense 
that stated, since Milligan was in an area where the war was not, he should have 
been tried in a civil court and not under military tribunal. The military stated that 
the military tribune was necessary since they doubted the effectiveness of an 
Indiana court. (Hall, 1997)
The Court was unanimous in its decision with Justice David Davis, writing 
the majority opinion and a separate opinion written by Justice Salmon Chase,
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joined by Justices Samuel Miller, Noah Swayne, and James Wayne, concurring.
Davis wrote in the opinion,
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rules and people, 
equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all 
classes of men, at all times and under all circumstances. No doctrine, 
involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of 
man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the 
great exigencies of government...Martial law cannot arise from a 
threatened invasion. The necessity must be actual and present; the 
invasion real, such as effectually closes the courts...Martial rule can never 
exist where the courts are open, and in that proper and unobstructed 
exercise of their jurisdiction. It is also confined to the locality of actual 
war...the framers of the Constitution, doubtless, meant to limit the right ad 
trial by jury, in the Sixth Amendment, to those persons who were subject 
to indictment or presentment in the fifth. (Davis, 1866, pp. 4-5)
According to the majority opinion, martial rule could not be imposed and a
tribunal could not be accomplished on a civilian when the civil courts remained
open. That, simply put, there was no power that the Executive held to do this.
(Tribe, 1986) The opinion also stated that not even Congress had the power to
enact martial law and suspend habeas corpus in an area where the civil courts
were open. (Rehnquist, 1998)
The concurring opinion of Chase agreed with the majority, sans the part of
where the majority stated that not even Congress could have enacted such
measures. Chase, and the others who concurred with his opinion, stated that
under the war powers Congress could enact legislation necessary to prosecute
under the war and to do so even if the civil courts were open. (Chase, 1866)
Even with this difference, the outcome of the case has been hailed for its
“rejection of the government’s position that the Bill of Rights had no application in
wartime. It would have been a sounder decision, and much more widely
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approved at the time, had it not gone out of its way to declare that Congress had 
no authority to do that which it never tried to do.” (Rehnquist, 1998)
This case shows how the model can be used to describe the constriction 
of the President’s power. The power Lincoln used was not unlike the power he 
used in the past. The difference is, by the time the case reached the Supreme 
Court, the Civil War had ended. As the model shows, when the war has ended, 
the need for Presidential power expansion is over and a constriction occurs.
The Civil War ended in 1865. The main fighting ceased when Union 
General Ulysses S. Grant ordered the surrender of Confederate General Robert 
E. Lee at the village of Appomattox Court House in Virginia on April 7*^ . Lee took 
until the 9**^  to agree upon the terms of surrender. It took until May to give word 
to the entire Confederate army that surrender had been issued. Between the 
surrender of Robert E. Lee in early April and the final word to Confederate 
soldiers in May, President Abraham Lincoln had been assassinated by John 
Wilkes Booth on April 14* .^ Vice-President Andrew Johnson assumed the 
presidency the next day. (Civilwar.com, Timeline)
The Civil War era in the “expansion and 
constriction” model 
The Civil War is first viewed in the “Expansion and Constriction” Model by 
giving President Lincoln the need to assume more power in securing the civil 
protection of the Union even if it came at the expense of the civil liberties of the 
same people he had tried to protect.
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Power is sometimes given to the President in times of war by Congress or 
the Constitution. President Lincoln did not wait for Congress to give the power 
he felt he needed to be effective during the Civil War; he took it for himself 
through the silence of the Constitution. An example of this is when President 
Lincoln suspended habeas corpus in areas where the war had not yet arrived. 
Lincoln did so in a preventive measure rather than a measure performed out of 
direct necessity. He also instituted a blockade that resulted in the seizing of 
ships. This is an act that Congress would later back up; stating that all Lincoln 
did in the matter was covered retrospectively by the rule of Congress. An early 
version of the Espionage Act of World War I was seen when Lincoln allowed 
General Order #38 which stated that nobody could declare sympathy for the 
enemy. This included speaking out against the draft. President Lincoln also 
issued the order to try civilians in military tribunal, instead of functioning civil 
courts.
During the time of federal court involvement. President Lincoln showed 
that even when the Court ruled against him, such as in the case of Merryman, 
that due to the freshness of the Civil War. he could ignore the Court’s wishes. By 
ignoring the Court, Lincoln showed that it does not matter what the outcome of 
the case is, the item that does matter is that a case is brought up at all. The 
more cases brought up means the Supreme Court is giving more credence to the 
possible misuse of presidential power. It is shown in the Prize Cases, however, 
that when Congress, even retrospectively, gives power to the President, the 
power is accepted by the Court. The Court then ruled against a request for a
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civilian to be tried in civil court when the civilian broke an order given under 
martial rule. This power was allowed with two years still left in the Civil War. The 
Court ruled after the Civil War against the President’s use of having a civilian 
tried in a military tribunal when civil courts were open. The difference between 
the two rulings appears to be only the time in which they were delivered. The 
case decided in favor of the government occurred during a crucial moment in the 
Civil War, while the case against the government was decided after the need for 
the power had disappeared.
After the Civil War, the powers of the President seem to be on a course of 
readjustment to near pre-wartime levels. Starting with the case of Milligan, the 
President’s ability to try a civilian in a military tribunal when civil courts are in 
operation is taken away. It is also found that the President cannot declare 
suspension of habeas corpus in an area where war has not come; only Congress 
may do this. Further, both Vallandigham and Merryman eventually were freed 
and their sentences ignored by the United States government. This information 
fills the major components of the “Expansion and Constriction” Model. From the 
creation of the power given to the President back to the power being readjusted. 
All of the criteria fit and the model is shown valid for the Civil War era.
The chart for the Civil War era (Figure 2) is as follows:
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World War I era
The start of the First World War for the United States is a questionable 
date. In 1916, the United States military started to occupy strategic areas, while 
on March 12, 1917, after an unsuccessful request to Congress, President 
Woodrow Wilson issued an executive order to arm United States merchantmen. 
The United States formally declared entrance into World War I on April 6 by 
declaring war on Germany. On December 7, 1917, the United States also 
declared war on Austria-Hungary. (Firstworldwar.com, Timeline)
In 1917, Congress passed the Espionage Act. In this Act was a provision 
that made it unlawful to obstruct the government’s right to draft to create its army. 
It was also illegal to cause or attempt to cause any thoughts of Insubordination in
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the military. (Tribe, 1986) Charles Schenck was the general secretary of the 
Socialist Party. In the interest of his party, he directed the printing and 
distribution of flyers that were decidedly against the draft. The fifteen thousand 
flyers were then sent out to the men who were eligible for the draft near the 
Socialist Party headquarters in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The flyers urged 
men to visit the Socialist Party headquarters and sign a petition to Congress that 
would ask for the removal of the draft.
On August 28, 1917, federal agents entered the Socialist Party 
headquarters, seized all materials, and arrested Schenck. (Hall, 1997) Schenck 
was then tried in U.S. District Court (USDC) and found guilty; he then appealed 
to the USSC on the grounds that the Espionage Act was against the First 
Amendment and freedom of press. {Schenck v United States, 1919) The 
government stated that it was not a case about the First Amendment, rather one 
regarding the congressional method of raising an army. (Holmes, 1919)
Schenck, in his case, admitted that the pamphlets he created were to 
persuade the men in the draft to protest. He restated that this was perfectly 
allowable under the First Amendment protection of speech and press.
The unanimous Court decision, with Justice Oliver Holmes writing the 
majority opinion, saw that the defendant did have a case if he had done the 
distribution during peace time. In his opinion he admitted that, if the case 
happened during ordinary times, the defendant would have acted within his 
constitutional rights, however, the times were of war and the defendant must be
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judged according to the time of war. (Holmes, 1919) It is from this case that 
Holmes developed his “Clear and Present Danger” test.
According to Justice Holmes, if there was such a time that words could 
raise a clear and present danger to the society of the United States, the First 
Amendment would give way for the protection of the greater good. (Biskupic & 
Witt, 1997)
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in 
falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even 
protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all 
the effect of force. The question in every case is whether the words used 
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a 
clear and present dangers that they will bring about the substantive evils 
that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and 
degree. (Holmes, 1919, p. 5)
Even though Schenck was not successful in damaging the draft. Holmes 
indicated that it was not the outcome of the act, but rather the intent in which the 
act was performed which would be used to see if a violation had occurred or not. 
(Tribe, 1981) Stating that it was not unreasonable to find that the flyers could 
persuade the draftees into unlawful acts to refuse the induction, the United 
States Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Schenck. (Rehnquist, 1998) With 
this case, not only are actions against the government illegal, but also words that 
may incite such actions.
The model shows that when a crisis starts, the President enjoys the 
highest level of power. In this case the power was given to the President by an 
act of Congress. Flyers that could have been allowed in times of peace were 
found illegal to distribute at a time of war. The war was fresh, and the outside 
force of Congress was working to move the President’s power in an expansion.
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this led to the Supreme Court ruling unanimously in favor of the expansion of 
power. This supports the model, even with the outside force of Congress once 
again acting on the model, because it demonstrates the need for time to pass 
and the war to be over or unpopular for the power to constrict again.
One year after issuing a manifesto which denounced America’s entry into 
World War I, the Socialist Party held a convention in Canton, Ohio. During the 
convention, Eugene Debs gave a speech that included the world policy views of 
the Socialist Party. During the end of his speech. Debs commented on a recent 
event where he visited a location of the Socialist Party and found three of the 
more vocal male leaders were currently convicted under the Espionage Act for 
tampering with their eligibility for the draft. He then expanded on this issue 
stating that he was proud of those men and the women that also were arrested 
for blocking the military recruitment. At the end of the speech, he denounced the 
United States for persecuting his fellow Socialists under the guise of the 
Espionage Act. He went on to state that the leaders of the United States freely 
declared war while the working class, which could neither declare war nor peace, 
would be the one to fight the war. Four days later Debs was indicted by a grand 
jury. After being sentenced to ten years imprisonment. Debs appealed his case 
to the United States Supreme Court. (Rehnquist, 1998)
Debs V United States (1919) came immediately after Schenck and the 
“Clear and Present Danger” test was used. During his speech in Ohio, Debs was 
quoted saying, “You need to know that you are fit for something better than 
slavery and cannon fodder” and “You have your lives to lose; you certainly ought
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to have the right to declare war if you consider a war necessary.” (Debs, 1919, as
cited in Biskupic & Witt, 1997 p. 417)
The United States Supreme Court’s unanimous decision came down in
the form of Justice Oliver Holmes’ majority opinion. Using the test set in
Schenck, the Court decided that.
The one purpose of the speech, whether incidental or not does not 
matter...was to oppose not only war in general but this war, and that the 
opposition was so express that is natural and intended effect would be to 
obstruct recruiting. If that was intended and if, in all the circumstances, 
that would be its probable effect, it would not be protected by reason of its 
being part of a general program and expressions of a general and 
conscientious belief. (Holmes, 1919, p. 2)
After viewing the speech that Debs gave, the Court had to decide if his 
words were indeed intended to have a negative effect upon the recruitment of an 
army done by Congress at war time. Holmes, in the majority opinion, stated that 
there was evidence that before the speech. Debs had endorsed his party views 
that the involvement of the United States in World War I, was unjustifiable and 
should be opposed by all means. With these two items as evidence, the 
conviction of the lower court was upheld. (Biskupic & Witt, 1997)
Debs would later come up for pardon with President Woodrow Wilson and 
the pardon was denied. A successful attempt at pardon, however, was 
accomplished under President Warren G. Harding in 1921. (Rehnquist, 1998)
Although Debs was later pardoned, it is important to note that this case 
gave more credence to the vague powers of the Espionage Act. Not only did the 
Court allow the government to control written material that might be reasonably
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seen as anti-government, but it also allowed control over public speech at a
sanctioned political gathering.
As the war was still raging, the power of the President came into question.
This case demonstrates the need for continual questioning of the President’s
expanded power, as shown in the model. As Debs was eventually pardoned, it
also shows that with time and the end of the war, the constriction of power is
allowed, sometimes with an apology.
In 1918, Congress amended the Espionage Act to include the
amendments known as the Sedition Act, making it unlawful to criticize the
government or Constitution. (Government Printing Office, 1919)
Abrams v. United States (1919) cited five Russian-born defendants living
in the United States for five to ten years. They lived in New York City, meeting in
a room rented by one under an assumed name. Jacob Abrams, one of the five,
purchased a printing kit and made use of it in the basement room making
pamphlets urging opposition to possible United States intervention against the
Bolshevik regime. The pamphlets, printed in Yiddish stated.
Workers, Russian emigrants, you who had the least belief in the honesty 
of our Government must now throw away all confidence, must spit in the 
face of the false, hypocritical military propaganda which had fooled you so 
relentlessly, calling forth your sympathy, your help, to the prosecution of 
the war.With the money which you have loaned, or are going to loan them, 
they will make bullets not only for the Germans, but also for the Worker 
Soviets of Russia. Workers in the ammunition factories, you are 
producing bullets, bayonets, cannons, to murder not only the Germans, 
but also your dearest, best, who are in Russia and are fighting for 
freedom.
Workers, our reply to the barbaric intervention has to be a general strike! 
An open challenge only will let the Government know that only the 
Russian Worker fights for freedom, but also here in America lives the spirit 
of revolution. (Abrams, 1919, as cited in Rehnquist, 1998, pp. 180-181)
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For this pamphlet, Abrams, and the others, were charged with trying to 
incite, provoke, or encourage resistance to the United States. When the United 
States was at war, any willful attempt to persuade against the United States, 
either by verbal, or written, communication, was defined as unlawful and 
punishable. (Government Printing Office, 1919)
When addressed to the United States Supreme Court, the majority upheld 
the conviction. Justice John Clarke, who wrote the majority opinion, cited that 
the writers of the pamphlets wanted to halt the war effort by bringing in a major 
strike. (Rehnquist, 1998) The reasoning for the majority was that any questions 
engaging the constitutionality of the Espionage Act as a whole had been 
disposed of by Schenck v United States (1919) and Debs v United States (1919). 
Schenck introduced the "shouting Fire in a crowded movie theater" idea, while 
Debs was decided based on Schenck. At wartime, it is important not to do things 
that would incite a riot or revolution from within. Using both of the cases to set 
the course of precedent. Justice Clarke so wrote the majority opinion. (Cohen & 
Varat, 2001 )
Dissenting were justices Oliver Flolmes and Louis Brandeis. They saw the 
letters were against the Germans, whom the United States was fighting, and only 
stated that the United States should not pursue attack on the Russian people, 
which the writers felt a connection. (Rehnquist, 1998)
In dissent, Flolmes stated the very precedent the majority used. He 
agreed with the precedent, as he did write the Schenck majority, but he said he 
needed to expand on his opinion. In dissent. Holmes stated, "I never have seen
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any reason to doubt that the questions of law that alone were before the Court in 
the cases of Schenck, Frohwerk and Debs were rightly decided...only the present 
danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in 
setting a limit to the expression of opinion where private rights are not 
concerned." (Holmes, 1919, pp. 21-22) He went on to further chastise the 
majority, "In this case sentences of twenty years imprisonment have been 
imposed for the publishing of two leaflets that I believe the defendants had as 
much right to publish as the Government has to publish the Constitution of the 
United States now vainly invoked by them." (Holmes, 1919, p. 23)
Holmes failed to persuade the majority. Instead of using a redefined 
stricter version of the "clear and present danger" test, his colleagues used a "bad 
tendency test" which is a test that came from English common law. Instead of 
asking, "Do these words cause an immediate and clear threat?" the question 
turned to, "do these words have the tendency of making something bad 
happen?" (Epstein & Walker, 2001, p. 216)
According to Holmes’ diary, the dissent troubled some of the majority 
justices so much that they called on Holmes at home in an effort to persuade him 
not to publish the dissent. They asked this to show unity on an issue they 
thought was central to the safety of the country. The issue, and the precedent set 
in the case, eventually became a moot point as the Sedition Act of 1918 was 
repealed in 1921. (Cohen & Danelski, 1994)
The Supreme Court is shown divided in this case. The opinion used in a 
previous case was now used in dissent. The case came at the time when the
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war was almost over and, as the model shows, the constriction of Presidential 
power was gaining momentum. The power used by the President still came from 
Congress, but the act will later be repealed shortly after the war. This is an 
example on how, according to the model, the President's power may be 
constricted. The power is not constricted by the Court, but by an act of law.
The end of World War I came on November 11, 1918. The cleanup 
process of World War I followed and was marked by the presentation of the 
Treaty of Versailles on May 7, 1919 to Germany and the signing of the treaty on 
June 28, 1919. (Worldwarone.com, Timeline)
World War I era "expansion and 
constriction” model
The crisis of World War I was to be the war that ended all wars. During 
World War I, President Woodrow Wilson acted differently than President Lincoln. 
President Lincoln took the power he needed and then was backed up by the 
USSC and Congress later, or he would ignore any ruling unfavorable to him while 
citing he had the Union’s best interest at hand. President Wilson was given 
power in the form of the Espionage Act and the Sedition amendments by 
Congress.
The Espionage Act, much like General Order #38 of the Civil War, made it 
unlawful to disrupt the draft and to attempt to cause any insubordinate thoughts 
in the military. The Sedition Act made it unlawful to criticize the Constitution or 
government.
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The importance of the war, along with the vague nature of the Espionage 
Act, with the Sedition Act in addition, forced the cases from the World War I era 
to be ruled by the USSC for the government in every case. Towards the end of 
the war, however, dissent amongst the justices, especially Justice Oliver Holmes, 
show a turning nature in the thought of the nation. As stated in the Civil War era, 
the outcome of the case is not as important as the fact that the case is 
happening. With dissent, there comes a chance that the dissent will be used as 
a reason behind a majority opinion at a later date. With dissent the government 
shows uncertainty if the power of the President is being used correctly or even if 
it is too broad.
The resulting readjustment of power to near pre-wartime levels is not as 
powerful as it was in the Civil War. The Espionage Act remained, but it was also 
a power given slightly before the World War. Its amendment of the Sedition Act, 
however, had been repealed and the descendents of the people tried under the 
Act have been compensated for the past. After World War I, Debs was 
eventually pardoned, just as the case was for the Civil War trials. The United 
States was out of a time of war and the grip made during war loosened.
The chart that shows the World War I era (Figure 3) is as follows:
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Figure 3. Chart for World War I Era 
World War II era
The exact date of United States’ involvement in World War II is debatable. 
On January 6, 1941, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt made public a pact 
made with the United Kingdom that the United States would allow use of its 
military equipment in a Lend-Lessee manner. President Roosevelt singed Lend- 
Lessee into being on March 11, 1941. On March 30, sixty-five Axis ships in 
United States territory were seized for “protective custody.” The United States 
Navy sank a German submarine that it found while on patrol of the Atlantic 
Ocean on April 11, 1941. On May 27, 1941, President Roosevelt declared an 
“unlimited national emergency” and urged the creation of a stronger military 
force. Then on June 5, 1941, the United States sent a sizeable Marine force to
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Iceland in secret to prepare for a possible war. President Roosevelt also started 
to freeze Axis accounts in the United States while hostilities inclined. During 
June 22, Germany invaded the Soviet Union, as a result, on June 24, President 
Roosevelt extended Lend-Lessee to the Soviet Union. In the fall 1941, German 
submarines started to attack United States freighter ships and the United States 
responded with help of the British air force. On December 7, 1941, Japan 
bombed Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The United States declared formal war against 
Japan on December 8. As a response to the declaration of war by the United 
States, Japan declared war against the United States after the bombing of Pearl 
Harbor; Germany and Italy were forced to declare war against the United States 
by treaty with Japan on December 11, 1941. (“World War Two” n.d.)
When the United States and Germany were at war during World War II, 
Richard Ouirin and seven other individuals from the German armed forces were 
trained to infiltrate and sabotage opposing war machines. Four of the men, 
including Ouirin, were sent via German submarine to Amagansett Beach on Long 
Island, New York. Landing in July 1942, they branded German military uniforms, 
which they promptly buried, and then dressed in civilian clothing. They carried 
with them explosives and incendiary devices. The other four landed in Ponte 
Vedra Beach, Florida. All eight men were arrested by the FBI in either New York 
or Chicago. They were charged with the plan of destroying the war industries in 
the United States. (Rehnquist, 1998)
President Franklin D. Roosevelt then established a military commission to 
try them for transgression against the United States and for breaking the Articles
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of War. (Hall, 1997) Roosevelt, after the special commission was made, blocked 
any trial by civilian courts of these individuals. (Rehnquist, 1998) Seven of the 
Germans wanted petitions of habeas corpus filed for them. The United States 
Supreme Court denied the petitions and six of the Germans were executed a 
week later. (Hall, 1997)
The Supreme Court did issue a full opinion late in October regarding Ex 
Parte Quirin (1942), the unanimous opinion stated that the military trial was within 
the President’s power, especially when combined with the congressional 
adoption of the international common law of war. The Court went on to find that 
the accused were tried fairly with the military commission and the sentence 
would remain due to the sufficiently charged order of unlawful belligerency. (Hall, 
1997) The Court deemed that civil trial privileges and constitutional privileges did 
not apply to those who entered the United States as belligerents. It was also not 
necessary for Roosevelt to set up a special commission because Congress 
already had military commissions set up to try those found guilty against the laws 
of war. (Biscupic & Witt, 1997)
The opinion the Court stated that it was important for the war effort to 
allow, not only the protection from the enemy abroad, but also the ability to seize 
the enemy from within. The enemy, according to the Court, had broken the laws 
of war when Ouirin tried to sabotage the United States from within its boarders. 
(Tribe, 1981)
With this case the United States Supreme Court gave a broader power to 
the President where terrorism on American soil was concerned. This was done
37
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
by allowing citizens of a foreign government, which have not formally declared 
war on the United States, to be tried as enemy combatants if the individuals have 
been suspected of committing crimes against the United States. Instead of being 
allowed privileges given under the Constitution, the offenders must answer 
directly to a military tribunal, even if there is no direct war in the United States 
and the civil courts are open.
This case shows again the support of Congress increasing the President’s 
power. It differs from Lincoln’s era due to the nationality of the offenders were 
that of Germany and not of the United States. There was one exception of a 
party in Quirin who said that they were a naturalized citizen of the United States. 
This claim was mostly ignored by the Court and he was to stand trial with the rest 
of the enemy combatants. The model shows that because the President was 
given the power by Congress, and the war was in the beginning stages, the 
expansion of power allowed the President to order military tribunals for those he 
labeled “enemy combatants” .
World War II saw the United States worry about its Japanese population 
on the West Coast. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, at the advice of numerous 
officials and the Western Defense Command, signed Executive Order number 
9066 which empowered the secretary of war to create areas from which United 
States citizens could be excluded. The Order was signed in February; in March 
Roosevelt created the War Relocation Authority. The War Relocation Authority 
created the power to contain all West Coast Japanese American citizens.
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Congress unanimously passed legislation strengthening the executive orders. 
(Hall, 1997)
Gordon Hirabayashi was born in Seattle, Washington. In 1942 he was a 
senior at the University of Washington while General John DeWitt imposed the 
curfew. Consciously ignoring the curfew Hirabayashi remained in an area 
deemed a military area to be void of Japanese Americans. He was arrested and 
convicted in federal court. Stating that the executive order itself was 
unconstitutional, Hirabayashi wanted his case to be taken to the United States 
Supreme Court. (Rehnquist, 1998)
The Court voted unanimously to uphold the sentencing of Hirabayashi. 
Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone delivered the majority opinion in Hirabayashi v 
United States 1943. In the opinion the Court discussed three basic items.
The first was that Japanese immigrants were not eligible for American 
citizenship. Under Japanese law, the American born children of the Japanese 
immigrants were to be considered Japanese citizens to stop the assimilation of 
the Japanese culture.
The second point that the Court made was, with the United States at war 
with Japan, a reasonable conclusion could be made by Congress and the 
President that there might have been spies and saboteurs of Japanese citizenry 
living in the United States. During times of war, the Legislative and Executive 
may make laws or orders to ensure the safety of the nation, even if such orders 
may place one ethnic group aside from another. (Hall, 1997)
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The last thing the Court based the decision on was the fact that Roosevelt 
did not act alone, but rather he had the full unanimous backing of Congress. The 
act was allowed due to the constitutional power of the federal government, along 
with the joint action of Congress and the President, during an emergency time of 
war. (Stone, 1943)
Though the decision was unanimous. Justices William Douglas, Wiley 
Rutledge, and Frank Murphy wrote separate opinions. Murphy wrote in his 
opinion that this would be the first time that the Court had allowed a substantial 
restriction of civil liberty of the citizens of the United States based solely on their 
ancestry. Murphy then likened the treatment of the Japanese Americans to that 
of the Jews in Germany. He also stated that this action went to the very limit of 
what the government could do, war time or not. (Murphy, 1943)
This case showed that even when the President receives the power of 
Congress to do an action, when his power is at its highest, the Court can still 
debate within itself if the power is justified. The dissents in this case show that, 
although the outside force of Congress can affect the model, it can still stand. 
The dissent in the Court shows that, during the time of war, the Court tends to be 
indecisive in constricting the President’s power.
Korematsu v United States (1944) was a case where after an executive 
order to clear parts of the West Coast out from Japanese aliens and Japanese- 
Americans, a natural born citizen protested the relocation. This was the first time 
the Court heard a case that did not deal with a curfew, but rather total relocation 
based on ancestry.
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Corning to argument in October 1944, the Court reached a decision. 
Basing the reasoning on the precedent set forth in Hirabayashi v United States 
(1943), Justice Hugo Black wrote the majority decision which confirmed the side 
of the government. (Rehnquist, 1998) The opinion stated that exclusion was 
justified by the presence of an unknown number of disloyal citizens of Japanese 
origin. Congress, and the executive branch, through the exercise of the war 
powers, possessed the constitutional authority to exclude citizens from certain 
areas during the time of war. (Melone, 2000)
Black explained that the Court, in Hirabayashi, sustained the conviction 
because it was an issue of curfew. The curfew was constitutionally prohibited 
due to its discriminatory nature, but was upheld as an action of the government 
during war time to help prevent espionage and sabotage in an area threatened 
by Japanese attack. (Black, 1944) There were three separate dissents by 
Justices Owen Roberts, Francis Murphy and Robert Jackson.
The dissenters voted to uphold the curfew, but to strike down the 
relocation. Justice Roberts, in dissent, stated that the case of Hirabayashi was 
good because it kept people off the streets and it could not be reasonably seen 
as the precedent to keep people indefinitely out of their own homes and 
relocated to another area against their will. In short. Justice Roberts believed the 
case showed a definite, indisputable, and clear violation of constitutional rights. 
(Cohen & Danelski, 1994)
In dissent. Justice Jackson offered reasons why the Court should not be 
used as a tool to enforce a law that was created by the military for use on the
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citizens of the United States. According to Jackson, the Court lacked the ability 
to judge a military order. It lacked the expertise to declare the order bad or good. 
Jackson also stated that an order, made in a place of the United States that was 
disrupted to the point of martial rule, need to be successful, not lawful. Jackson 
then issued his thought that if the Court should be able to confine the military to 
the rules of the Constitution, neither should the Constitution be distorted to give 
acceptance to the laws made under martial rule. If one military law is ruled 
constitutional. Justice Jackson rationalized that then all military laws must be 
constitutional. If the Court ruled for the government, then the Court would lose its 
identity as a civil court and it would become an agent of military rule.
Jackson saw that the law should not have been able to stand up in the 
Court due to its nature. The Court, traditionally, played a part of a safeguard 
against misuse of law creating powers of the Congress and of the President. 
Without the ability to keep the creators of laws in a check, the Court loses power 
and the American public loses a safeguard against the agencies that, not only 
create law, but also have rule over the military to enforce the law.
Justice Jackson was worried that there would come a time when the ability 
to use the military on United States soil would become abused, and since the 
Court ruled for the government in Korematsu, that abuse would go unchecked. 
He stated, if a military commander over stepped his bounds under the 
Constitution, it becomes an incident, but if the Court rules and approves of that 
incident, then it becomes a doctrine added to the Constitution. (Jackson, 1944)
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One of the main concerns Justice Jackson expressed about the law is that 
it singled out a certain ethnic group. That the citizens of the United States were 
being found at fault for nothing more than not being able to choose their parents 
at birth. Nowhere in the law issued did it state that criminals against the United 
States, even if they were of Axis Power heritage, were bound to the law issued.
Another concern of Jackson’s was that United States’ citizens of Japanese 
ancestry, subject to that law, were found impossible to comply. The law stated 
that the citizens, like the residents subject to the curfew upheld in HirabayashI, 
could not leave their homes. This particular law also added in the fact that they 
also could not stay in their homes. The only way for United States citizens to 
comply with this law was to turn themselves over to the military for interrogation, 
detention, and indefinite relocation to a designated area. With the Court in 
agreement with the executive order, the government was given great power to 
use military law, which was not constitutional in foundation or usage, in areas not 
under siege. (Jackson, 1944)
One can see that the same case used for precedent in the majority can 
also be called upon in a dissent. In this case the majority felt that the goal of the 
executive order was more important than the ability for a United States citizen to 
live where he or she wanted. Thus, the citing of Hirabayashi confirmed their 
decision to expand the power of allowing, curfew to allowing the relocation of the 
citizens as well.
The majority did agree, however, that the reasoning behind both cases 
dealt with the United States' right to defend itself and sometime impose certain
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issuances that might stifle the normal living conditions of its citizens during time 
of war. As Justice William Rehnquist stated, “this case brings to reason the Latin 
maxim of Inter arma silent leges or ‘In time of war the laws are silent’.” 
(Rehnquist, 1998, p. 224)
The model shows that during the war the Court will remain undecided in 
its action regarding to constrict the President’s power. This is reflected at the 
Court decision stage in the model. In this case, the Court questions the use of 
the military as a legislative power. The Court, due to the time of the war and the 
President’s support by Congress, becomes indecisive in regards to constricting 
the President’s power.
The Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Immediately 
after this attack the territorial governor, Joseph B. Poindexter, under the authority 
of the Organic Act of 1900, suspended habeas corpus. With Hawaii under 
martial law, U.S. Army General Walter C. Short took command over the territory. 
General Short organized military tribunals and closed all civil courts and used this 
position to try any civilian for violations of military orders under a military tribunal. 
(Hall, 1997)
Lloyd Duncan was a civilian ship fitter in the Honolulu Navy Yard. In 
February 1944, he was arrested for getting into a fight with two armed marine 
sentries. He was charged with violation of a general order that prohibited assault 
on military personnel. He was then tried in a military court and found guilty. He 
was sentenced to six months in prison.
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Upholding his protest to being tried in a military court, Duncan sought a 
writ of habeas corpus from Judge Delbert Metzger. Judge Metzger granted the 
writ stating that the military had no place trying the civilian Duncan and therefore 
he should be released to a civil court. (Rehnquist, 1998)
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision by 
Metzger and as a result, Duncan v Kahanamoku (1946) went before the United 
States Supreme Court. With a 6-2 decision, the Court decided to overturn the 
decision by the Court of Appeals. Justice Hugo Black delivered the majority 
opinion while Justices Francis Murphy and Harlan Stone concurred; dissenting 
were Justices Harold Burton and Felix Frankfurter.
In his majority opinion, Black stated that the Organic Act’s authorization of 
martial law did not set up authorization for the military to close the civil courts and 
try civilians by military tribunes. Black went on to state that the dangers of war 
were not, at the time of the offense, pressing nor immediate. The offense, 
beyond being a bar fight that involved two military personnel, did not involve 
malicious acts towards the military at all.
Justice Murphy filed his concurring opinion that added, since the civil 
courts could have been in operation, and there was not an immediate threat to 
their safety, trying a civilian by military tribunal was not constitutional.
Chief Justice Stone agreed with the outcome of the case, but wanted to 
make sure that the point of the civil courts not being endangered, in any sense, 
and, therefore, should never have been closed by the military, was understood.
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In dissent were Justices Frankfurter and Burton. Their base of dissent 
stemmed from the time of the Court’s decision. They argued that the Court was 
using hindsight to judge a case instead of using the facts, as they were at the 
time the offense happened.
In closing the section on the World War II cases, two quotes are used. The 
first is from Laurence Tribe, “ Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that there are 
constitutional limits on the jurisdiction of courts-martial, restriction which draw 
their force from the fact that courts-martial do not afford defendants the 
procedural rights which the Constitution guarantees in Article III proceedings.” 
(Tribe, 1981, p. 60) That is to say, even in wartime, unless very dire 
circumstances present themselves, civilians should be tried in civil court and not 
in a military tribune. Justice Rehnquist’s comments on Duncan fit not only that 
particular case, but rather as a description of the United States Supreme Court 
itself, “ ...the good news for the people of Hawaii was that the court held that 
marital law there during World War II had been unlawful; the bad news was that 
the decision came after the war was over, and a year and a half after martial law 
had been ended by presidential order...here is also the reluctance of the courts 
to decide a case against the government on an issue of national security during a 
war.” (Rehnquist, 1998, p. 221)
This case shows that the power used by the executive, during a time of 
war, does not translate into a power the executive may use when war is not 
present. The model shows that timing plays an important factor in the Court 
deciding to constrict the executive’s power. The timing of this case happens after
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the war has ended. This case is just one of the first cases of the World War II 
era that would lead to the constriction of the executive’s power.
The end of World War II happened in stages. Germany officially 
surrendered in the Russian Headquarters in Berlin, Germany, on May 7, 1945. 
Japan surrendered on August 15, 1945 in a radio address by the Emperor of 
Japan. (“World War Two”, Timeline)
World War II era “expansion and 
constriction” model 
World War II shows a return to the President taking power instead of 
asking for it. Different philosophies exist on how of the Presidents themselves 
choose to act as President. The action of taking power, against the action of 
asking for power to be given, seems to be a component of presidential 
philosophy and is not in the range of this thesis. It is important to note that the 
“Expansion and Constriction” Model is shown valid for both.
Power taken by President Franklin D. Roosevelt mirrors that taken by 
President Lincoln in allowing martial rule to be declared and having civilians be 
tried in military tribunals while civil courts are open. This power was taken away 
from the President at the end of the Civil War and reappears during the World 
War II era. President Roosevelt also established military tribunals to bring 
foreign nationals to trial as enemy nation combatants, if they were found on 
United States soil trying to sabotage. During the course of World War II,
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President Roosevelt gave orders which restricted where Japanese Americans 
could live.
While complaints were filed at the federal level, the war was in different 
points of flux during the decisions of the Court cases. In the case that involved 
enemy combatants on United States soil, the Court found the power pre-existed 
for the President to summon a tribunal to give a trial to an enemy. The Court 
then ruled that relocation and curfew for Japanese Americans was allowable due 
to the constitutional power given to the President and Congress to mark certain 
territory, during times of war, as places citizens cannot go. The point that the 
relocation was aimed solely at one ethnic group was given in dissent. One year 
away from the end of the war, dissent started to become stronger against the use 
of the President’s expanded power. It would be after the war had concluded that 
the government would lose a case built around executive power gained during 
the war. The Court ruled, as it had in the Civil War, that if the civil courts are 
open then a civilian cannot be tried in a military tribunal.
As the power of the President readjusted to near pre-wartime levels the 
United States President kept the power to try a military combatant in a military 
tribunal, with the reasoning of the power is pre-existing of the war and is a power 
set in the Constitution. The relocation and curfew of the Japanese Americans, 
however, were found unconstitutional; apology by the government was given, 
along with reaffirmations to the descendents of those re-located. The tribunal 
method of trying civilians while the civil courts were in operation, once again, was 
taken away.
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The chart for the World War II era (Figure 4) is as follows:
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Figure 4. Chart for World War II Era 
Korean War era
The United States’ involvement in the Korean War began on June 26, 
1950, when President Harry S. Truman authorized General Douglas MacArthur 
to send ammunition and military supplies to protect Seoul, South Korea from 
falling to the North Korean Army. On June 27, 1950, the United Nations Security 
Council issued a resolution that requested for members to give military aid to 
South Korea. On the same day, President Truman offered the United States Air 
Force and Navy as military help to South Korea. On June 30, 1950, President
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Truman allowed the use of United States ground forces in the Korean War. 
(Korean-war.com, Timeline)
In 1951, the steel industry had a labor dispute. In December 1951, the 
United Steelworkers Union announced that it would begin a strike at the end of 
the month when its contract ended with the steel companies. The Federal 
Mediation and Conciliation Service and the Federal Wage Stabilization Board 
tried to work a settlement out between management and labor. The efforts were 
unsuccessful, and on April 4, 1952, the steel industry workers released a 
statement saying that on April 9, they would go on strike. (Epstein & Walker, 
2001 )
On the eve of the strike. President Truman told Secretary of Commerce, 
Charles Sawyer, that the steel mills were to remain open, even if it meant that the 
United States government would run them. The order was given at a time where 
any stoppage in the production of steel would seriously threaten the efforts of the 
United States in the Korean War. (Tribe, 1981)
After issuing the executive order to Sawyer, Truman immediately gave 
Congress notice of his actions. The response of Congress was to take no action 
for or against the executive order. Relying on previous instances of executive 
seizure without congressional approval during wartime, Truman thought his 
actions to be valid as the Commander-in-Chief. (Hall, 1997) The result was 
fourteen impeachment resolutions were introduced in Congress, the steel 
companies sought an injunction against Sawyer and the solicitor general refused 
Sawyer permission to even see the brief. (Tribe, 1981)
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While Truman argued that the executive power of being commander-in- 
chief allowed for his actions, the steel industry brought up the Labor 
Management Act of 1947. The Act, they stated, was to let the parties come up 
with their own settlement during bargaining, and if no settlement was reached, to 
allow Congress to become involved. The steel industry stated that the act of 
being silent meant Congress had rejected the executive act of seizing the steel 
mills. (Hall, 1997)
The Supreme Court, in Youngstown Sheet and Tube v Sawyer (1952), 
ruled 6-3 in favor of the steel mills. Justice Black wrote the majority opinion and 
Justices Frankfurter, Burton, Jackson and Clark concurred. The three dissenting 
justices were Vinson, Reed and Minton. Vinson wrote the dissent.
Black, with Douglas, in his majority opinion stated that the, "President's 
power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or 
from the Constitution itself. There is no statute that expressly authorizes the 
President to take possession of the property as he did here. Nor is there any act 
of Congress to which our attention has been directed from which such a power 
can fairly be implied.” (Black, 1952, p. 1)
Four justices-Burton, Clark, Frankfurter, and Jackson stated that although 
the President may have more powers than those enumerated in Article II, he 
nevertheless went against the implied will of Congress when the executive order 
to seize the steel mills was issued. (Epstein & Walker, 2001) Jackson, in his 
opinion, stated.
When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or 
implied will of Congress, his power is at the lowest ebb, for then he can
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rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional 
powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive 
presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from 
acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so 
conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at 
stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system. (Jackson, 
1952, p. 6)
Justice Jackson also went on to state that the President’s powers fluctuate 
during certain times. Jackson described three situations which he felt the 
President’s powers might be challenged.
1. When the President acts according to the direct or implied 
authorization of Congress then his power is at its strongest. His power under this 
method includes all power granted to him by the Constitution, powers granted out 
side of the Constitution and any measure he may take that acts in accordance to 
the will of Congress. If any act the President does is deemed unconstitutional 
during this level of power it is a sign that the United States government itself 
lacks the power the President was trying to use. It is at this level, according to 
Jackson, that the burden of persuasion may fall on the challenger.
2. When the President uses power in the absence of the will of Congress, 
he can use his own Constitutional powers as well as ones that have come from 
other sources outside of the Constitution. It is through the silence of Congress 
that the President enjoys this level of power. During this time the actual events 
that shape the time also shape the President’s power, rather than theories of law
3. When the President uses power against the will of Congress he is at 
his lowest form of power. The President must rely solely upon power given to 
him by the Constitution, weighed against the Constitutional power Congress may 
enjoy in the same matter. (Jackson, 1952, pp. 7-8)
Justice Jackson then wrote in his dissent that President Truman’s
executive order fell into the last and least justifiable category. That was the
reason Jackson used to vote against the President’s use of power.
The previous cases have shown that when Congress acts as an outside
force to give the President his power, the Courts are reluctant to constrict the
power. Justice Jackson’s dissent describes this in better detail. When the
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President acts alone, against the will of Congress, his power is at his lowest. 
When the President acts and Congress is silent, his power is at a mid level. The 
highest level occurs when the President acts and has the support of Congress. 
The addition that is made to observation of Jackson by the model is that timing 
has a lot of value to the issue, if the war is popular, or fresh, then the Court will 
find it harder to constrict the President’s power. When the war becomes 
unpopular or starts a downswing, the constriction process may begin. This case 
shows the introduction of an international governing body as the catalyst for the 
President’s expansion of power. This outside power acts upon the model like 
Congress would, however the actions are not as strong as if Congress ordered 
them. This shows that the President can use power he felt necessary to respond 
to an international organization, but the power is not at a high level since the 
request and support did not come from the Congress. The model shows that 
since the Korean War, at the time of the case, was unpopular and not backed by 
Congress, the constriction of the President’s power occurred.
On July 7, 1953, the United States, China, and North Korea signed an 
armistice ending the Korean War for the United States. South Korea did not sign 
and had only signed a non-aggression treaty in 1991. (Korean-war.com, 
Timeline)
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Korean War era “expansion and 
constriction” model
While the war was never formally declared by the United States against 
North Korea, the Korean War is still a form of crisis for the United States. During 
the war, President Truman gained the power to wage a longstanding war without 
the consent of Congress to declare war. Truman also settled a labor dispute 
which he felt necessary to keep the war effort running. Like Presidents Franklin 
Roosevelt and Lincoln, President Truman did not ask for the power he received, 
but rather took it for himself.
The result at the federal level was that the President could sustain a war 
without the consent of Congress during a time of need. The Court did decide, 
however, against the government in regards to the steel-mill dispute. This 
happened as the war effort became greatly unpopular and the war itself did not 
have a visible end to it. This shows that even if the war is not on the decline, if it 
becomes overly unpopular that this may substitute for the decline in the 
“Expansion and Constriction” Model. This is due to the lack of support for the 
war by Congress; as Justice Jackson noted, the President is at his lowest power 
when the Constitution is silent and the Congress is not openly supporting the 
President.
When power was readjusted to near pre-wartime levels. President Truman 
lost any power he may have gained by having undeclared war against North 
Korea. Eventually the President’s ability to wage an undeclared war was limited
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and the basis for the limitation started with President Truman’s action in the 
Korean War.
The chart for the Korean War era (Figure 5) is as follows:
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Figure 5. Chart for Korean War Era
Conclusion of the war eras 
The conclusion of Chapter 2 shows that even though different 
circumstances brought the different wars, though the Presidents achieved power 
through different means, and though the wars ended under different 
circumstances, the “Expansion and Constriction” Model showed to yield valid 
pattern.
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CHAPTER 3
THE USA PATRIOT ACT ERA 
This chapter shall look at the beginning of the USA PATRIOT Act era 
which was caused by Al-Qaeda attack against the United States on September 
11, 2001. Following the review of the attacks, the USA PATRIOT Act will be 
examined. To conclude the chapter it will be seen if the USA PATRIOT era can 
be explained by the “Expansion and Constriction” Model introduced in Chapter 1 
and established in Chapter 2.
History of the USA PATRIOT Act era 
The United States’ war on “terrorism” resulted from the attack on 
September 11, 2001. At 8:15 a.m. Eastern Time Zone, American Airlines flight 
11 was noticed to be off course. The airplane would be the first of four planes to 
be hijacked that day. American Airlines flight 77, United Airlines flight 175 and 
United Airlines flight 93 were also hijacked.
As a result of the hijacking, American Airlines flight 11 was piloted into 
New York City, New York, and subsequently into the north tower of the World 
Trade Center at 8:47 a.m. United Airlines flight 175 was piloted into the south 
tower of the World Trade Center at 9:03 a.m. American Airlines flight 77 crashed 
into the Pentagon in Washington, District of Columbia, at 9:48 a.m. The final
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airplane, United Airlines flight 93, crashed into the area near Shanksville, 
Pennsylvania, at 10:06 a.m. (“Flight” , 2001)
The United States Congress declared war on “terrorism” on September 
15, 2001. This declaration did not specify a particular group or nation. In 
declaring war on “terrorism”. Congress did not declare a conventional war but 
rather drafted the “Authorization for Use of Military Force” (AUMF) resolution. 
(“What Sort of War”, 2001) The AUMF allows the President to use all force he 
deems necessary against the nations, organizations or people, he considers a 
threat. He can also use force against those he believes planned, authorized, 
committed or gave aid to the terrorist attacks, including any nation that is 
suspected in harboring the terrorirsts. (“Use of Force”, 2001)
The USA PATRIOT Act was then drafted to enhance the Executive’s 
power to carry out the “Use of Force Resolution.” The Bush Administration 
drafted the act.
The USA PATRIOT Act 
On September 24, 2001, the Bush Administration submitted the anti­
terrorism legislation to Congress while the ACLU and other civil liberties groups 
released the "In Defense of Freedom at a Time of Crisis" statement:
Hearings have just started in the House of Representatives with other 
hearings scheduled September 25th, on the Anti-terrorist Act of 2001. The 
proposed legislation is intended to "combat terrorism and defend the 
Nation against terrorist acts.” It now appears to be moving on an 
expedited schedule although many in Congress and elsewhere are 
encouraging the House and Senate to go cautiously and prudently without 
rushing into this legislation. (2) A broad coalition of civil rights and civil 
liberties groups as well as other political, religious, immigration, and
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related organizations have signed the "In Defense of Freedom at a Time 
of Crisis" statement. The diverse coalition has just been established 
because of concerns about threats to civil liberties as the Nation
addresses security and other issues in this time of war. (“Chronology of
the Patriot Act”, n.d., p. 3)
On October 10, 2001, the anti-terrorism bill went to the Senate floor. On 
October 11, the House anti-terrorism bill passed through the Judiciary 
Committee. On October 24, 2001, the House passed the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001. The new bill, H R. 3162, 
was the result of negotiations to resolve differences between House and Senate 
anti-terrorism bills (H R.2975 and S. 1510). On October 25, 2001, the Senate 
passed H R. 3162, which is known as the USA PATRIOT Act. The vote was 98-1 
with Senator Russ Feingold (Wl) the only member voting against passage of the 
bill. On October 26, 2001, President Bush signed the USA PATRIOT Act into law 
in a Rose Garden ceremony. The time taken from introduction to passing into a 
law was 16 days. (“Chronology of the Patriot Act”, n.d., p 4)
Title I deals with giving the Executive increased power over the internal
security of the states. There are no cases of record against Title I powers.
Title II deals with surveillance, its methods, its definition, and its 
jurisdiction. Surveillance has been increased to include cases against chemical 
weapons, terrorist threats, computer fraud and abuse. This Title is one of the 
main parts of the USA PATRIOT Act that has come under review in the public.
In a July 26, 2002, response to the Committee on the Judiciary in the 
United States House of Representatives, the Assistant Attorney General, Daniel
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J. Bryant, stated that there were no cases against or complaints filed against Title 
II of the USA PATRIOT ACT. The letter states that under Section 203, there had 
been approximately 40 disclosures of information from grand juries to other 
branches of the federal government. When asked which area of the federal 
government the information went to and how many separate grand juries were 
the source, Bryant replied, “The Department has not drawn a distinction between 
foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, or foreign intelligence information shared 
in these disclosures...We do not maintain such data (on the sources of the 
information)”. (Bryant, 2002, p. 6) When asked if the information was asked for in 
a reasonable time from the court supervising the grand jury as per Section 203, 
Bryant stated that notices were filed in at least 38 districts in a timely fashion, but 
the exact time of the filings could not be recalled due to the department not 
maintaining records on the subject. In respect to the disclosure of other 
materials from Title II, Bryant was vague at best, never giving a direct number 
and often citing that the question could not be answered because the information 
was classified and an answer would be provided to the correct authorities when 
deemed necessary. (Bryant, 2002)
The government has cited that Title II has helped the FBI to find and stop 
Florida resident Sami Al-Arian. Section 218 was used in investigating Sami Al- 
Arian and other members of a Palestinian Islamic Jihad cell in Tampa, Florida.
Al-Arian was charged, in February 2003, with conspiracy to commit 
murder in an attempt to help Palestinian suicide bombers in Israel. (Goldstein, 
2003) Previously the FBI had telephone and fax taps on Sami Al-Arian but could
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not share the information with local law enforcement until the passing of the USA 
PATRIOT Act.
Al-Arian is being accused of using his charity, school and think tank as 
covers for raising money for Islamic Jihad. Al-Arian claimed that the enterprises 
are all legitimate and was designed for Muslim education and to further 
relationships between Arabs and Americans.
Defense attorneys for Al-Arian have stated that they will do everything 
they can to challenge every aspect of the USA PATRIOT Act. Calling the Act a 
result of the government overreacting to 9/11, defense attorney, William B. 
Moffitt, believed he can be successful in whittling away the USA PATRIOT Act 
with the information found in this case.
The United States government has responded by saying without the help 
of the USA PATRIOT Act, Al-Arian would not have been caught. The 
government went further in stating that the FBI had information that would have 
been useful in the arrest of Al-Arian for over a year and not being allowed to 
share the information with the local authorities that could make the arrest was 
frustrating. The point was given with an example of the critical reaction of efforts 
to deport Al-Najjar, Al-Arian’s brother-in-law. Although the FBI had information 
that would have made the deportation process of Al-Najjar better received and 
easier to accomplish, the FBI could not submit the information they had due to 
pre-USA PATRIOT Act restraints. (“Fla. Case Puts Patriot” , 2004)
In September 2003, Portland, Oregon, a group of United States citizens 
was charged with the attempt to travel to Afghanistan to contribute their services
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to Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The case was built upon evidence gathered through 
recording devices applied to the inside of resident’s homes. The devices 
remained for months. During this time everything that was said within the house 
was recorded. This included conversations of the owners of the homes, their 
guests and even children. The ACLU claims that such devices put into homes 
for an extended period of time, without the knowledge of the owners, goes 
against the Fourth Amendment. The surveillance through Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC) warrants originated in 1978 to allow the FBI and 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to spy on American citizens for the express 
restriction of use in hunting foreign spies. The warrant is issued by a secret court 
and probable cause does not need to be shown, as it does in a normal criminal 
warrant. In addition to an ordinary court warrant, a special warrant can be issued 
by Attorney General Ashcroft which allows 72 hours of surveillance before a 
court warrant is sought out. (Kramer, 2003)
Under the USA PATRIOT Act, the attorneys for the defense cannot see 
material gained by the surveillance unless they can show definite deception by 
the government in gaining the information. This, according to the ACLU, makes 
the defense come against a difficult situation; “Obviously there is no way to make 
that showing if the material is secret.” (ACLU, 2002)
The Portland case strengthened the government’s claim to Title II powers 
as half of the defendants eventually entered a guilty plea with agreements to 
testify against the other half of the people involved. The government, through the
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use of Title II, stopped an act of war against the United States by using 
information gained. (Kramer, 2003)
Search and seizure is another problem area. According to the May 13, 
2003 letter to the Judiciary Committee from Bryant, federal investigators have 
been allowed, on over a dozen occasions, to delay informing people about 
searches or seizures of their property. The delays have lasted for as long as 
three months and have been extended more than 200 times.
There were 47 separate occasions which searches were conducted and 
the informing of the target had been delayed, while on 15 separate occasions, 
property was seized and the owners were not told until the federal authorities 
deemed it necessary.
The United States Attorney General, John Ashcroft, stated that he 
personally authorized over 170 emergency orders for surveillance that allowed 
officials 72 hours of surveillance before they had to seek permission from a 
secret court. Ashcroft declined to state how many of the 170 cases involved 
terrorism. The report also stated less than 10 FBI field offices have conducted 
investigations involving mosques and only 9 of them were connected to ongoing 
criminal investigations. (Bryant, 2003) Two senators, Ron Wyden (D-OR) and 
Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), recently submitted a bill that would limit the Title II and 
FISA surveillance techniques to only foreign intelligence gathering and not 
criminal cases, bringing the FISA warrants back to their original purpose.
The expanded FISA powers were later questioned for constitutionality in 
court. The court was a secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review.
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The decision was reached after a closed hearing and the power given to the US 
government by the USA PATRIOT Act was used during the trial. Namely, only 
the government was allowed to present its side of the case and the statements 
made by the government to obtain the wiretaps were held confidential and not 
available for review. In a normal wiretap case the defense attorney would have 
access to all statements made by the government that led to the securing of the 
wiretap. Under the USA PATRIOT Act the government material is classified and 
the defendant’s lawyer can only examine the material if they can show evidence 
of government deception. Without examining the material there is no way of 
showing deception in the material. This line of logic was also upheld in the 
secret court, even though it was one of the centers of concern from the ACLU 
and others that supported the defendants through amicus curiae briefs. The 
Supreme Court declined to hear the case.
Section 203 was also used in capturing Zacarias Moussaoui, John Walker 
Lindh, Richard Reid, Jose Padilla, and Abu Zubaydah. Since the investigations 
are still pending, most details are classified.
In 2002, Jose Padilla v. George W. Bush (2002) was a challenge to the 
government’s decision to use the USA PATRIOT ACT to hold a U.S. citizen Jose 
Padilla in a military jail without charges, trial, or access to a lawyer. Padilla was 
detained as a material witness, in Chicago, Illinois, during May 2002, for a federal 
grand jury investigation of the September 11^ attacks and was being held in New 
York. In June, President Bush declared Padilla as an “enemy combatant” and 
therefore subject to military custody, not civilian. Padilla was placed in a Navy
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jail in Charleston, South Carolina. On December 4, 2002, District Court Judge 
Michael B. Mukasey of New York rejected the government’s claim that the 
government could hold Padilla indefinitely without any trial or access to counsel. 
Judge Mukasey did state that the government should be entitled to deference 
due to the circumstances of Padilla, however Padilla should have the right to a 
court hearing in regards to his designation of “enemy combatant.”
Judge Mukasey reaffirmed his ruling on a separate opinion on March 11, 
2003. The government has filed an appeal in the Second Circuit, meanwhile the 
Padilla military case has been continued under classified circumstances. 
(Mukasey, 2002)
The FBI has initiated broad sweeps to monitor, question, arrest, detain or 
deport various immigrants. Young Arab and Muslim males were the first group; 
Middle Eastern and South Asian heritage people were the second group; the 
third group was done as part of “Operation Liberty Shield” and was not 
specifically identified with a racial category. All of the detainees have been given 
counsel and the government cannot reveal any going-ons, including appeals 
made by the detainees, as this is classified information.
The FBI, with the new powers, has charged over 200 suspected terrorists. 
Section 205 has allowed the FBI to hire over 264 new translators, including 
Arabic and Farsi.
Section 209 which allows voice mail from a third party provider to be 
seized with a search warrant has been used in recent criminal cases.
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Section 212 has been used to obtain records and communications from 
internet service providers. It has been used to trace kidnapper communications 
and also to investigate a bomb-threat before the threat could be carried out at a 
high-school.
Section 216 has allowed the track of communications of terrorist 
conspirators, at least one major drug trafficker, a bank identity thief, a four time 
murderer, and a fugitive using a fake passport. The investigation of the murder 
of Daniel Pearl was also aided by 216.
Title III deals with money laundering and different ways of funding terrorist 
organizations or activities. It gives the federal government powers to label 
individuals or groups as terrorists and withhold domestic or international money 
transfers from or to the individuals.
According to a government report, 304 names of aliens (245 money 
launderers and 50 spouses or children of suspected terrorist) have been added 
to a database of counter-terrorism. This ability is new with the USA PATRIOT 
Act and the information sharing abilities it grants.
Section 319 has been used to seize funds that were placed in a Belize 
bank after the Belize government stated that they would release the funds, only 
to have the Belize courts block the release of funds. The funds were deposited 
by James Gibson, who earlier fled the United States. Further use of 319 led to 
secure funds of almost 1.7 million dollars. These funds will be used to 
compensate victims of the defendant’s schemes.
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Title IV deals mainly with the ability for non-citizens to travel to and 
around the United States. Immigrants and people applying for citizenship status 
are addressed in Title IV.
Section 411 allows the United States government to redefine “terrorist 
organization” and “engage in terrorist activity”. This means more organizations 
could have been added to the terrorist list, however, the exact list is not known. 
This also allows the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to deport more 
aliens on the grounds of removal being security related.
Title V is used to remove barriers between law enforcement agencies, 
as well as to give newer tools and the ability for more extensive searches on 
individuals who are labeled terrorists.
Title VI creates the funding for the law enforcement agents and other 
people who have a role in the government’s war on terrorism. Title VI does not 
have any sections of note. The Title was drafted to secure funds for the agents, 
for the victims, and the victim’s families of terrorist attacks.
Title VII serves the main goal of strengthening provisions for the federal, 
state, and local law agents to share information and work together. Title VII is 
made entirely of one section. The section gives the ability for multi-jurisdictional 
work to be preformed with greater ease.
Title VIII gives the government increased power to define what a terrorist 
attack is. It also attributes criminal cases with the ability to be handled within the 
provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act.
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Section 805 concerns the ban on material support, advice, and assistance 
provided to terrorists and terrorist organizations. This has been used on three 
notable accounts.
1) October 21, 2002. Six United States citizens in Buffalo, New York, were 
charged with providing support to terrorists by participating in weapons 
training in a terrorist camp in Afghanistan. At the camp they saw a suicide 
bombing video that detailed the attack on the USS Cole. While at the 
camp they also were given an in person speech by Osama bin Laden.
2) October 30, 2002. Two Pakistani nationals and one United States’ citizen 
were charged with conspiracy to provide Stinger missiles to anti-United 
States forces in Afghanistan. Syed Mustajab Shah, Muhammed Abid 
Afridi and Ilyas Ali were charged with conspiracy to sell heroin for money 
to provide aid to AI Qaeda.
3) November 1, 2002. Four men, including one United States’ citizen and 
one United States’ resident, were charged with conspiracy to sell weapons 
to provide support to a foreign terrorist organization in a drugs-for- 
weapons plot. They would have received 25 million dollars of cocaine in 
exchange for the weapons. (Bryant, 2002)
Title IX improves the ability for the United States to gather and use 
intelligence. This Title focuses on agency reports to Congress and the training of 
different federal agencies to fight terrorism.
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Title X clears up any definitions or loose ends created by the previous 
Titles in the USA PATRIOT Act. It also addresses the funding requests made by 
the USA PATRIOT Act.
Use of the USA PATRIOT Act 
This section deals with the use of the USA PATRIOT Act by the 
government. Listed and discussed are instances brought up by the government, 
cases filed against the government, legislation for the USA PATRIOT Act and 
legislation against the Act. Both alleged proper uses and alleged abuses are 
included in this section.
In 2003, in Las Vegas, Nevada, the FBI confirmed that the USA PATRIOT 
Act was used to secure financial information in a strip club case that included 
four Las Vegas politicians and Michael Galardi, the owner of the clubs. Jaguars 
and Cheetahs. (Page, 2003)
After the 2003 FBI sting of the Las Vegas politicians, who were accused of 
accepting bribes from Galardi in return for favorable political decisions for his 
businesses, FBI Spokesman Jim Stern stated, “A section of the Patriot Act was 
used appropriately by the FBI and clearly within the legal parameters of the 
statute.” (Radke, 2003, p. 7B)
The elected officials of Nevada, not implicated in the sting, went on record 
with mixed opinions on the use of the USA PATRIOT Act. Senator Harry Reid 
(D-NV), who is the minority whip, stated, “The law was intended for activities 
related to terrorism and not to naked women”. (Kalil & Tetreault, 2003, p. 4A)
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Representative Shelley Berkley (D-NV) stated that she was going to inquire to 
the FBI about its guidelines for using the Act in cases that don’t involve terrorism. 
“ It was never my intention that the Patriot Act be used for garden-variety crimes 
and investigations” . (Kalil & Tetreault, 2003, p. 4A) Representative Jim Gibbons 
(R-NV) said it may be too soon to judge the Act and its uses. Senator John 
Ensign and Representative Jon Porter (both R-NV) declined to make statements. 
(Kalil & Tetreault, 2003)
Cases brought against the 
USA PATRIOT Act 
Libraries are expressing concerns with Title II stating that they must give 
information about their customers without informing the customer that such 
information had been given. This is not limited to library records, but also all 
property of the library, including the computers and computer use. The ACLU 
has filed a Freedom of Information lawsuit to press the government in releasing 
some information, to form an idea if the FBI is abusing its power. The questions 
asked by the ACLU, on behalf of the libraries, were similar to the questions 
asked by the House Judiciary Committee. In October 2003, the ACLU reported 
their findings.
Attorney General Ashcroft has gone to great lengths to keep secret even 
the most basic information about the FBI's spying. For example, in 
answering questions posed by the House Judiciary Committee, he 
classified information that should not have been classified, including 
information that would have shown how often the FBI is spying on people 
based on their exercise of First Amendment rights. The little information 
that we do have suggests that the FBI is abusing its powers. For example.
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a survey conducted by the University of Illinois suggested that, by 
December 2001, the FBI had already approached 85 out of some 1500 
libraries. (ACLU, 2003, p. 5)
Although the ACLU’s report showed that the FBI has been exercising its 
power given under the USA PATRIOT Act, the report lacks proof of misuse of the 
power. The report does not comment whether the FBI were legitimately using 
the requests, as a method of tracking a suspected terrorist, or not.
In response to the new FBI demands, a public library in Seattle, 
Washington, has printed over 3,000 bookmarks to hand out with the items 
checked out by their patrons. The bookmarks inform the patron that the FBI, with 
permission of a secret federal court, may inspect the patron’s reading list and its 
internet usage; the library would also not be allowed to inform the patron if the 
FBI was requesting information for surveillance. (Goldstein, 2003)
The Nevada Library Association (NLA) instituted a policy that has the 
computers log only the book a patron currently has checked out and erases that 
information from memory after the patron returns it. The computers are also 
wiped clear of internet memory after each day. This goes against the USA 
PATRIOT Act’s ability to request information as such from the libraries.
The NLA also urged Congress to repeal sections of the Act that go against 
the fundamental rights of the citizens of the United States. (Sebelius, 2003) The 
reasoning behind the NLA’s acts, according to Library District Executive Director 
Daniel Walters is, “A fundamental principle in public libraries is a lack of 
censorship, and there is no such thing without assurance of privacy.” (Koch, 
2003, p. 9B)
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In May 2003, the Kitsap Regional Library of Kitsap County, Washington, 
had a board of trustees meeting to discuss the Title II effects on the library 
system. Their response was to mandate that warning signs of the government’s 
“infringement on constitutional civil rights” (Gardner, 2003, p. 2B) were to be 
posted at all libraries in that district. The warning signs include the information of 
what can be requested without consent or knowledge and for how long records 
could be kept on individuals. The warning signs also add the personal feelings of 
the board of trustees that the USA PATRIOT Act has provisions that violate civil 
rights, and those provisions should be replaced. (Gardner, 2003)
Libraries are not the only targets of the USA PATRIOT Act. Journalists 
who reported on the internet hacker, “Lamo”, have been sent letters which stated 
subpoenas under the USA PATRIOT Act would be for all notes, emails, 
interviews, travel and expenses brought up during the creation of any article on 
Lamo. The main logistical problem that journalists are facing is that the FBI is 
requesting all records used in the articles to be reserved for three months; 
articles that have been written over one year ago. (Scassel, 2003)
Although not explicitly mentioned as an expanded power of the FBI, the 
FBI is using the term “ Internet Service Provider” to label “ Internet Service 
Consumer.” With this relabeling, the FBI has sent letters of intent to subpoena 
materials gathered by journalists and have strongly requested that the journalists 
“not disclose this request or its contents to anyone.” (McCullagh, 2003, p. 1) 
Both the relabeling of “Provider” to “Consumer” and the request of non-disclosure
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are not covered in the expanded power of the FBI under the USA PATRIOT Act, 
although they are citing the Act as the basis of such power, namely from Title II.
The acts under Title III have been used to label charity organizations as 
groups linked to terrorism and be acted upon as such. Title III has led to 
investigations of any form of money transfer that may be linked to terrorism. New 
arrests and detentions have been made by federal agents who have targeted 
certain charitable groups that send money abroad, especially to the Middle East, 
shutting those organizations down under investigating terrorism. (Michaels & Van 
Bergen, 2002)
The effect of Title III also branches out into the business world of the 
United States. Investors who have had their funds in over-seas accounts now 
have an indefinite waiting period before the United States government releases 
those funds for use in the United States. According to James Cullers of 
Literature Publications Incorporated, a small business in Las Vegas, Nevada, he 
has been waiting for funds still in classified investigations after over a year of 
requesting the funds being transferred from their over-seas bank account. 
(Cullers, 2003) In Boston, Massachusetts, state legislative Representative Key 
Khan (D) had a wire transfer blocked because her husband, Nasir Khan, a 
naturalized citizen, has his name on a special list. The list was made up of 
people who could have had their name used as an alias. No notification was 
given to Representative Khan until an extensive search was done through her 
department. (Goldstein, 2003)
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The Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), based in California, has been 
instructing the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in international human rights law. 
Since the PKK is currently labeled as a terrorist organization by the United 
States, the Humanitarian Law Project would be breaking the law under the USA 
PATRIOT Act if it continued to provide instruction in human rights law. The HLP, 
instead of waiting for the government to bring charges, filed a direct lawsuit 
against United States Attorney General John Ashcroft.
Humanitarian Law Project v John Ashcroft (2004) was decided by the 
United States District Court of California, Judge Audrey Collins presiding. During 
the case David Coal, a Georgetown University law professor, argued for the 
plaintiff. John Tyler, attorney for the Justice Department, handled the case for the 
United States. Coal argued that the USA PATRIOT Act was overbroad in parts, 
especially in the language that was used to define illegal acts. In her decision 
Judge Collins stated that since the USA PATRIOT Act made providing “expert 
advice or assistance” illegal, that the definitions should be more narrow and as 
they are now the open-ended definition of “expert advice or assistance” is 
“impermissibly vague and in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments.” (Judge 
Collins, 2004, p. 1 ) There are no distinctions between advice given to help end a 
resolution peaceably and advice that would encourage violence. (“Court Rules 
Against” , 2004)
The federal government, under the USA PATRIOT Act, has detained 
approximately 1200 people. Reasons for detention fall under three categories: 
material witnesses, immigration violators, and federal crimes. The first two
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categories are groups of people who have not had their names released to press 
or even their families.
In August 2002, federal District Court judge Gladys Kessler ordered the 
Justice Department to release the names of all detainees held. 
“Unquestionably,” she said in her opinion, “the public’s interest in learning the 
identity of those arrested and detained is essential to verifying whether the 
government is operating within the bounds of law.” (ACLU, 2002, p. 13) Two 
weeks later, after being contacted by the federal government. Judge Kessler 
changed her ruling so that immediate disclosure of the names of the first two 
groups was not needed. (Moyers, 2002)
On November 28, 2001, the ACLU of New Jersey, under state law, 
requested the names of all Immigration and Naturalization Service detainees 
held in Hudson and Passaic County jails. This request was denied by the 
government. On January 22, 2002, in New Jersey Superior Court, they argued 
that New Jersey state law requires disclosure of the information. Then on March 
27, 2002, New Jersey Superior Court Judge Arthur D’ltalia granted access to the 
records. The government announced its intention to appeal and was granted a 
45-day stay of the ruling. After April 22, the Department of Justice issued an 
interim regulation that purported to override state law in New Jersey and 
elsewhere by prohibiting state and local officials from releasing the names of INS 
detainees housed in their facilities. On the basis of the Justice Department’s 
interim regulation, the state court of appeals reversed the trial court. The New
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Jersey Supreme Court refused to hear the appeal. {ACLU of New Jersey v. 
County o f Hudson, 2002)
During April 22, 2003, the ACLU of Northern California filed a federal 
lawsuit challenging the secret “no fly” , and other transportation, watch lists. The 
lawsuit, filed in federal district court, follows two Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) and Privacy Act requests. According to the ACLU, the lawsuit was 
necessary because the government had refused to confirm the existence of any 
protocols, procedures, or guidelines, as to how the “no fly” lists were created. 
The ACLU also claims that the government refused to detail how the lists are 
being maintained or corrected and, importantly, how people, who are mistakenly 
included on the list, may have their names removed. The ACLU is seeking 
immediate release of those names and procedures to gather the names.
The ACLU earlier filed the FOIA and Privacy Act requests on behalf of 
itself and Jan Adams and Rebecca Gordon. In 2002, both women were told by 
airline agents that their names appeared on a secret “no fly” list at San Francisco 
International Airport. The women were briefly detained by San Francisco Police 
while their names were checked against a “master” list. In March, the ACLU 
asked for a list of names to be released by the airport. On April 8, the airport 
released 400 pages of documents which confirm that 339 air passengers, 
between September 2001 and March 2003, were stopped or questioned at San 
Francisco International Airport in connection with the “no fly” list. [Rebecca 
Gordon et al., v. FBI et al., 2003)
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Osama Awadallah was charged with making two false statements during a 
grand jury proceeding arising out of the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11. The charges 
were later dropped. Awadallah was held by the U.S. government shackled and in 
solitary confinement for a total of 83 days, from September 21 until December 
13, 2001. He was initially held on a material witness warrant. After his 
appearance before a grand jury, 20 days following his detention, he was indicted 
on charges of perjury because he had denied knowing the name of one of the 
Sept. 11 terrorists.
During May 2002, Judge Shira A. Scheindlin of the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of New York, dismissed the perjury charges against him and 
ruled that his detention, as a material witness, without being charged was 
unlawful. {United States v Osama Awadallah, 2002)
On October 2002, Yaser Hamdi v. Donald Rumsfeld (2004), was brought 
about due to the government’s decision to detain United States’ citizen, Yaser 
Hamdi, in a military jail without charges, trial, or access to a lawyer. Then on 
August 16, 2002, a federal District Court Judge in Richmond, Virginia, ordered 
the government to produce additional evidence to support its decision to 
designate Hamdi as an “enemy combatant.” The government appealed the 
decision to the Fourth Circuit. On January 8, 2003, the Fourth Circuit held that 
the government’s showing of concern was enough evidence to label Hamdi as an 
“enemy combatant” and therefore deny him access to counsel and leave him in 
the military jail. {Hamdi v Donald Rumsfeld, 2004)
76
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
For June 28, 2004, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Hamdi v 
Rumsfeld (2004). The ruling enabled both United States citizens and foreign 
nationals seized as suspected terrorists the right to stand trial under United 
States court. This ruling is a direct counter against the USA PATRIOT Act by 
being directed against the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which 
the USA PATRIOT Act was created to support. The specific part of the AUMF 
which was being protested was the power of holding the suspects indefinitely 
with no chance of having a trial in a court. The ability to deny access to a lawyer 
while being interrogated was also taken away by the Court’s ruling. The Court 
did not rule fully against the government and upheld the President’s ability to 
label United States citizens as suspected enemy combatants and hold them as 
such. This power, according to the Court, was given to the President from the 
Congress in the form of the USA PATRIOT Act. The difference between that 
particular power from the USA PATRIOT Act and the powers they ruled against 
was given by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, “clear that a state of war is not a 
blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the nation's citizens.” 
(O’Conner, 2004, p. 1) Justice O’Connor then went on to state that, although the 
Court declared that the suspected terrorists were entitled to a trial, a military 
tribunal may suffice.
The ruling had concurring opinions, dissents and dissents in part. The 
Court was split on not only the issue of the case, but also of how to interpret the 
possible issues. Judicial blocs were also split as Chief Justice William Rehnquist 
joined with the liberal side of the Court’s decision and moderate Justice John
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Paul Stevens joined the conservative side of the Court. Justice O'Connor, 
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Anthony Kennedy and Justice Stephen Breyer, joined. 
Justice David Souter filed an opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and 
concurring in the judgment, which Justice Ruth Joan Bader Ginsburg joined. 
Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, which Justice John Paul 
Stevens joined. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a separate dissenting opinion. 
{Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 2004)
In its opinion, the Court analyzed the main components of the case. Is 
Hamdi allowed due process and who can be declared an “enemy combatant”? 
The Fourth Circuit court declared, basing its ruling upon Ex parte Quirin, "one 
who takes up arms against the United States in a foreign theater of war, 
regardless of his citizenship, may properly be designated an enemy combatant 
and treated as such." (Ex parte Quirin, 1942) According to the Fourth Circuit 
court, since Hamdi was found in a land which the United States was at war with, 
he was no longer a citizen, but could be labeled an “enemy combatant” and 
treated as such with no claim to due process.
In the Court’s decision, it is stated that the designation of “enemy 
combatant” had not been defined by the government. The usage in the case had 
been assumed by the Court to mean, "part of or supporting forces hostile to the 
United States or coalition partners and engaged in armed conflict against the 
United States” . (O’Connor, 2004, p. 2)
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The AUMF authorizes the President to use all necessary and
appropriate force against nations, organizations, or persons associated with the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Justice O’Connor wrote in her opinion.
There can be no doubt that individuals who fought against the United 
States in Afghanistan as part of the Taliban, an organization known to 
have supported the al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for those 
attacks, are individuals Congress sought to target in passing the AUMF. 
We conclude that detention of individuals falling into the limited category 
we are considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which they 
were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be 
an exercise of the "necessary and appropriate force" Congress has 
authorized the President to use. (O’Connor, 2004, p. 2)
In dissent, Scalia and Stevens suggested that there is a special procedure
for imprisonment of a citizen accused of aiding the enemy in a time of war. They
stated that, although in the plurality that O’Connor wrote stated that the prisoners
of war must be released at the end of hostilities, it only applies to enemy aliens,
and not citizens being accused of being traitors. Citizens who are accused of
being traitors are tried under criminal law. Stevens and Scalia went on in dissent
to discuss that the 1679 Habeas Corpus Act made it clear that indefinite
imprisonment, on reasonable suspicion of helping the enemy, was not an option
as long as the writ was not suspended. “The proposition that the Executive
lacks indefinite wartime detention authority over citizens is consistent with the
Founders' general mistrust of military power permanently at the Executive's
disposal.” (Scalia, 2004, p. 34)
Scalia and Stevens’ dissent concluded that even though many may think
liberty should give way to security in times of crisis, that at the “extremes of
military exigency, inter arma silent leges.” (Rehnquist, 1998, p. 224) should hold
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no meaning in applications of the Constitution to any case wartime or not. 
(Scalia, 2004)
In contrast, the dissent of Justice Thomas stated that the United States 
government is acting perfectly within its limits of the war powers given to the 
Executive, and that the government should not have to give the suspected 
terrorists a trial, or allow them to have a lawyer present while being interrogated. 
(Thomas, 2004)
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg concurred with part of the plurality 
and a dissent with the plurality. They agreed with the plurality’s rejection of any 
limitation on the exercise of habeas corpus. They could not agree, however, with 
the statement of the plurality that the AUMF gave the government the power to 
detain anyone that is designated as an “enemy combatant” , solely because they 
are declared as such by the President.
The Court stated that, even though a decision which gave the right of the 
alleged terrorists the opportunity to have lawyers present during interrogations 
and to have a trial under a United States court, the decision itself was limited to 
those prisoners being held at Guantanamo Bay, and not to prisoners held by the 
United States elsewhere.
The ruling of Hamdi shows a rarely used part of the model. The war on 
“terror” has not ended and the President has gained the powers he is using by 
the Congress. Previously it has been established that if the power is given by 
Congress then the Court is more reluctant to constrict the power, also if the war 
is ongoing it is rare to find the Court constricting the President’s power. The
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reason why Hamdi apparently goes against the model is because of popular 
opinion is shifting towards constricting the President’s power. Popular opinion is 
acting as an outside force on the model. The model shows that opinion can 
strengthen the power, as in the time of World War II relocations, and that it can 
weaken the power, as in the Korean War. This ruling means, according to the 
model, that the point at which the Court remains undecided to restrict the power 
has past. The constriction has begun, however, since Congress was the agent 
that gave the President power, the expansion of the power is still the trend. This, 
according to the model, is because of a lack of the war’s end. The war on “terror” 
has started to become more unpopular, but it has not met the breaking point.
After the ruling on Hamdi became public, the Las Vegas Review-Journal 
ran a story from the Associated Press on July 3, 2004, that according to Gina 
Holland, nine Guantanamo Bay detainees had challenges filed on their behalf as 
recently allowed by the decision of Hamdi. According to the report, 
approximately 600 more detainees are expected to have challenges filed for 
them.
The attorneys for the nine detainees stated in their Friday court filings that, 
“the prolonged, indefinite, and restrictive detention is arbitrary and unlawful” . 
(Holland, 2004, p. 2A) At time of the filing. Pentagon spokesman. Major Michael 
Shavers, went on record stating, “No decision has been made on how we are 
going to comply with the Supreme Court ruling. The ruling wasn’t simple, and 
while we certainly will comply, the exact manner is still being discussed.” 
(Holland, 2004, p. 2A)
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In United States v. Richard Reid (2003) the ACLU of Massachusetts filed 
amicus curiae brief opposing a broad gag order that barred Reid’s lawyer from 
talking to other lawyers, including anyone in his office, about his case. The court 
gave Reid’s attorney permission to expand the number of people he talked to as 
long as the discussion related to the defense of Reid. The conversation for the 
lawyer was strictly limited to the legal field and could not be discussed in the 
press. Later Reid pleaded guilty. {United States v Richard Reid, 2003)
On August 22, 2002, the Justice Department stated that a secret court had 
limited the ability of investigators to coordinate surveillance against terrorism 
suspects and announced plans to appeal the ruling. In an unprecedented move, 
the federal government appealed a May ruling by the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISA), stating it unnecessarily narrowed new anti-terror laws 
that allowed a wider berth in conducting electronic surveillance and in using 
information obtained from the wiretaps and searches. In the previously secret 
May ruling, the court criticized the government for a number of misstatements 
and omissions in applications, and stated it had violated court orders regarding 
information sharing between investigators and prosecutors. But in the May 
ruling, made public for the first time August 22, 2002, the court ruled that 
intelligence officials cannot give advice related to the surveillance to investigators 
carrying out the searches or wiretapping. The court also implemented an 
oversight requirement.
The workings of the court have been kept secret. The court, made up of 
judges designated by the Supreme Court Chief Justice, deals mostly with secret
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or top secret information and has never before published any of its rulings. 
(Charles, 2002)
On April 6, 2004, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a lawsuit 
against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The lawsuit. Doe and ACLU v 
Ashcroft (2004), was filed following the guidelines set by the FBI in a gag 
provision, a power given to the FBI by Section 505 of the USA PATRIOT Act. 
The lawsuit challenged the FBI’s use of the National Security Letters (NSL) that 
allow the FBI to demand customer records from Internet Service Providers (ISP) 
and other information or business services. The records could be demanded 
based solely on the FBI’s suspicion of an individual and did not require judicial 
oversight. The ACLU based its lawsuit on grounds of First and Fourth 
Amendment violations inherent in Section 505. The gag provision delayed the 
disclosure of the case for two weeks from the initial filing. The ACLU claimed 
that the USA PATRIOT Act was overbroad in granting the FBI the power to 
demand personal business information of an individual without judicial oversight 
or informing the individual being investigated. The government, as in past cases, 
has stated that the sensitive and timely nature of anti-terrorist efforts require the 
ability to search personal records without the delay a judicial oversight would 
cause. (“In ACLU Case”, 2004)
On September 29, 2004, Judge Victor Marrero of the Southern District of 
New York, ruled in favor for the ACLU. The ruling declared Section 505 of the 
USA PATRIOT Act illegal. The decision was based on two issues. The first 
issue was with regard to the gag provisions, and was held unconstitutional due to
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the First Amendment. The second issue was in regard to the demanding of 
personal business records without oversight; this was overturned based on the 
Fourth Amendment. In his decision, Judge Marrero stated, “Under the mantle of 
secrecy, the self-preservation that ordinarily impels our government to 
censorship and secrecy may potentially be turned on ourselves as a weapon of 
self-destruction." (Marrero, 2004, p. 2)
After the ruling the United States Government released information stating 
that the case was not against the USA PATRIOT Act itself, but rather against an 
older law upon which Section 505 was based. Steven J. Duffield, a Senate 
Republican Policy Committee analyst, released in email that stated the ACLU 
lawsuit was not against the USA PATRIOT Act and that the ruling only struck the 
1986 law on which Section 505 of the USA PATRIOT Act was based. The ACLU 
claims that since Judge Marrero made comments in reference to the FBI’s power 
to demand email records of individuals, the claim that the case was against the 
1986 law is invalid. It is the ACLU’s claim that only Section 505 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act gave the FBI the right to demand email records without judicial 
oversight. In addition to the lack of the power to demand email in the 1986 law, 
the statute also only granted power to perform a search if the transmission was 
deemed to be going to or from a foreign agent, and not a civilian. (“ACLU Blasts”, 
2004)
The ruling in this case comes at a time when the war on terrorism is losing 
focus. The United States is in current debate whether the war is a winnable war 
and if the war is being handled properly by the current Bush Administration. The
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model shows that if the war is on a decline or if the popularity of the war is on the 
decline, then the power gained by the President, during a time of crisis, weakens 
as the crisis weakens.
Section 505 of the USA PATRIOT Act gave a power from Congress to the 
Executive that, during times of peace, would not have been created. It was not 
until almost three years after the creation of the power that a lawsuit had been 
filed against Section 505. This, according to the model, happens due to the 
passage of time allowing the courts to become less undecided on the action to 
take in regards to the expanded powers of the President. The model suggests 
that if the case would have been brought before the court when the USA 
PATRIOT Act was first passed, the decision would be in favor of the government 
and not the ACLU.
Legislative reactions to the 
USA PATRIOT Act 
Since the legislation put forth by Ann Arbor, Michigan, to limit the reach of 
the USA PATRIOT Act on January, 7, 2002 (Schabner, 2004), there have been 
258 more communities in 38 states, who include three state-wide responses to 
the USA PATRIOT Act, for a sum of almost 45 million people, who have joined in 
protest of the USA PATRIOT Act. The legislative powers in the places have 
passed measures that nullify some of the, in their belief, overbroad powers of the 
USA PATRIOT Act. (ACLU, 2004)
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Senators Russ Feingold (D-WI) (the only person to vote against the act), 
Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska) and Representatives Bernie Sanders (l-VT) and 
Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) and Joseph Hoeffel (D-PA) have tried to introduce bills 
that would take back portions of the act. The bills, however, have failed. 
(Holland, Jessie, 2003)
The government’s use of the USA PATRIOT Act allowed increased search 
and seizure projects. To perform the projects the government requested, 
additional funding needs to be released. On July 22, 2003, the House of 
Representatives voted 309-118 to strike down funding for a search and seizure 
power. (Hentoff, 2003)
In March 2003, a bill was introduced in response to library backlash. 
Vermont Representative Bernie Sanders (independent) introduced the Freedom 
to Read Protection Act. The act allows the same powers that Title II allows but 
the guidelines to use libraries as a means of surveillance are increased. 
(Garnder, 2002) Specifically, the proposed legislation would protect the privacy of 
patrons by preventing law enforcement agencies from compelling bookstores and 
libraries to release lists of books purchased or borrowed. The USA PATRIOT Act 
had broadened the scope of searches allowed under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act. The proposed legislation would also require the Attorney 
General to more completely report to the Congress on a regular basis, the results 
of such searches.
Due to not following procedure, the Freedom to Read Protection Act was 
not offered as an amendment to the Justice Department’s Spending bill. On
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Tuesday, July 22, 2003, restrictive procedural rules denied Bernie Sanders (I- 
VT), C.L. "Butch" Otter (R-ID) and John Conyers Jr. (D-MI) to offer their 
amendment to the Commerce-State-Justice Appropriations bill. The proposal 
would stop funds from being used to search bookstore or library records under 
Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act.
The House did adopt an amendment that prevents the Justice Department 
from “sneak and peek" warrants authorized by the USA PATRIOT Act. The 
House vote represents the first example of congressional intent to limit Justice 
Department powers under the Act.
The Safety and Freedom Ensured Act (SAFE Act) was introduced by a 
bipartisan coalition of senators led by Republican Larry Craig of Idaho and 
Democrat Richard Durbin of Illinois. The proposed act would put severe 
limitations on the use of the USA PATRIOT Act powers that dealt with domestic 
spying on college professors or students. (AAUP, 2004)
Legislative support for the 
USA PATRIOT Act 
Recently John Ashcroft made trips across the United States trying to rally 
support for the USA PATRIOT Act. These were done to promote the goals that 
the government has achieved only by having the Act in place. Ashcroft was 
asking for both popular and legislative support. He was asking for funding for the 
provisions of the Act, as well as giving information about the Act, so that states 
and local communities can enhance their constitutions with the Act instead of
87
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
creating barriers between the local and federal governments. Utah has been one 
of the states to draft legislation to improve the state’s ability to use the USA 
PATRIOT Act in respect to local law enforcement agents working alongside 
federal agents or agents of another county, city and even state.
PATRIOT II, has also come in support of the original USA PATRIOT Act. 
This item was drafted by the Bush Administration without the knowledge of 
Congress. In it the loopholes created in the USA PATRIOT Act have been 
closed. The bill, drafted by the staff of Attorney General John Ashcroft, entitled 
the Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003, includes the following major 
ideas that would change how the USA PATRIOT Act currently operates.
Section 201, “Prohibition of Disclosure of Terrorism Investigation Detainee 
Information”: Safeguarding the dissemination of information related to national 
security has been a hallmark of Ashcroft’s first two years in office, and the 
Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 follows in the footsteps of his 
October 2001 directive to carefully consider such interest when granting 
Freedom of Information Act requests. While the October memo simply 
encouraged FOIA officers to take national security into consideration without 
risking sensitive business information and personal privacy. The proposed 
legislation would enhance the department’s ability to deny releasing material on 
suspected terrorists in government custody through FOIA. (Lewis & Mayle, 2004)
Section 202, “Distribution of ‘Worst Case Scenario’ Information”: This 
would introduce new FOIA restrictions with regard to the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA). As provided for in the Clean Air Act, the EPA requires
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private companies that use potentially dangerous chemicals to produce a “worst 
case scenario” report detailing the effect that the release of these controlled 
substances would have on the surrounding community. Section 202 of this Act 
would, however, restrict FOIA requests to these reports, which the bill’s drafters 
refer to as “a roadmap for terrorists.” By reducing public access to “read-only” 
methods for only those persons who live and work in an area most likely to be 
affected by a worst case scenario, this subtitle would obfuscate an established 
level of transparency between private industry and the public.
Section 301-306, “Terrorist Identification Database”: These sections would 
authorize creation of a DNA database on “suspected terrorists,” expansively 
defined to include association with suspected terrorist groups, and non-citizens 
suspected of certain crimes or of having supported any group designated as 
terrorist.
Section 312, “Appropriate Remedies with Respect to Law Enforcement 
Surveillance Activities” : This section would terminate all state law enforcement 
consent decrees before Sept. 11, 2001, not related to racial profiling or other civil 
rights violations, which limit such agencies from gathering information about 
individuals and organizations. The authors of this statute claim that these 
consent orders, which were passed as a result of police spying abuses, could 
impede current terrorism investigations. It would also place substantial 
restrictions on future court injunctions.
Section 405, “Presumption for Pretrial Detention in Cases Involving 
Terrorism”: While many people charged with drug offenses punishable by prison
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terms of 10 years or more are held before their trial without bail, this provision 
would create a comparable statute for those suspected of terrorist activity. The 
reasons for presumptively holding suspected terrorists before trial are related to 
the nature of what a terrorist can accomplish if not held.
Section 501, “Expatriation of Terrorists” : This provision, the drafters say, 
would establish that an American citizen could be expatriated if he relinquishes 
his nationality by providing support to a group the United States declares as a 
terrorist organization. But whereas a citizen formerly had to state his intent to 
relinquish his citizenship, the new law affirms that his intent can be “inferred from 
conduct.” Thus, engaging in the lawful activities of a group designated as a 
“terrorist organization” by the Attorney General could be presumptive grounds for 
expatriation. (PATRIOT II, 2001)
PATRIOT II has not passed through legislation as of yet. Currently the 
Justice Department is requesting that PATRIOT II pass through legislation, while 
opponents of the Act are seeking petitions to stop the passing. (ACLU, 2003)
The model applied to 
the Patriot era
The attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, initiated the 
“Expansion and Constriction” Model by allowing the President to assume more 
power in hopes of both, preventing future terrorist attacks on the United States, 
and to deal with those responsible for the 9/11 attacks. Like President Lincoln,
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President Bush was granted the power to secure the civil protection of the United 
States, even if it was at the expense of the civil liberties of the United States.
President Bush did not take power, as did President Lincoln, nor did he 
wait for Congress to act entirely as did President Wilson. President Bush, and 
his administration, drafted the USA PATRIOT Act and then Congress passed it 
giving the President the power he sought.
During the war on terrorism. President Bush has instituted an attack on 
terrorism both at home and abroad. Searching for alleged terrorists in the United 
States, the USA PATRIOT Act has been used. Under the use of the Act, a 
person accused of being a terrorist can be put on a secret list which denies the 
ability to travel on commercial airlines, freezes the financial accounts, and allows 
for his or her indefinite detention and allows for trial under military tribunal as 
enemy combatants of the United States. As seen in Chapter 2, the previous war 
eras had cases similar and all have been found to be illegal after the war ended. 
The Court has even stated, during the Civil War, that during a time when civil 
courts are operational, a civilian may not be tried in a military tribunal. The 
indefinite detention of civilians in the United States is reminiscent of World War II 
and the detention-curfew imposed on Japanese Americans. With these 
similarities, it can be seen that during the beginning of the USA PATRIOT era, 
the President’s increased power allows for the government to defy what the 
Court has established.
President Bush, like President Lincoln, has shown that the courts may be 
held impotent. While President Lincoln ignored any court rulings against the
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government, President Bush showed that even when the courts have ruled 
against the United States {Center for National Security Studies v United States 
Department o f Justice, 2004) that, through letters sent by the Department of 
Justice to the presiding judge, he could persuade the judge to overturn the 
judgment due to the nature of the USA PATRIOT Act and the timely nature of the 
war on terrorism.
Again, as it has been shown through the other eras, it is not always the 
outcome of the court cases, but rather the increase in number of the cases 
themselves. Even in dissent, as in Justice Jackson’s dissent in the case of 
Korematsu, a trend can be shown for eventual readjustment of presidential 
power.
After the wars in the eras of Chapter 2 had either finished or had become 
too unpopular to continue, the President’s power began to readjust to near pre­
wartime levels. The problem faced in the USA PATRIOT era, is the lack of a 
conventional war. The United States is in a state of perpetual war on terrorism. 
Congress, when issuing the war on terror, did not define on which terrorist group 
war was declared. Instead of specifying a group. Congress has allowed the 
President to do what he felt needed to stop terrorism abroad.
This information fills the major components of the “Expansion and 
Constriction” Model and shows that the USA PATRIOT era does not fit the 
model. There is a current struggle of increasing the USA PATRIOT Act powers 
by one group whereas another group, is attempting to minimize the current 
powers. At present both groups are in a form of deadlock without the guidance
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of whom these powers, or lack, of will be directed to and safeguarded from. The 
problem lies with the lack of a declaration of war in a conventional means. With 
no conventional war declared, and with the support of Congress to wage war 
against an undefined nation, the power gained by the President cannot find a 
way to pre-wartime readjustment. The courts, although not silent, have become 
impotent and undecided. As can be seen in this chart (Figure 6), most of the 
cases decided against the government.
CHART OF CASE OUTCOMES
RULED FOR THE GOVERNMENT
The “Portland 7” case-United States wins with sentences of imprisonment 
against the still living members of the “Portland 7”. Case is dropped when the 
last member is confirmed killed in action overseas.
US V Richard Reid (2002)-Case is dropped when Reid pleads guilty.
Center for National Security Studies v United States Department of Justice 
(2004)-Decision later reversed by presiding judge.
RULED AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
Jose Padilla v. George W. Bush (2002)-Under Appeal by Government while 
Padilla’s military trial still goes on. (Case essentially ignored by United States; 
Padilla still imprisoned)
Humanitarian Law Project v John Ashcroft (2004)-United States asked to define 
“support” better in the USA PATRIOT Act.
Rebecca Gordon et al., v. FBI et al. (2004)-Government ordered to review the 
no-flv list for possible errors and give a sworn statement that they have reviewed 
it)
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United States v. Osama Awadallah (2002)-Case subject to Osama only.
Hamdi v Rumsfeld (2004)-0nly deals with detainees at Guantanamo Bay, and 
does not specify what sort of trial the detainees are allowed.
Doe and ACLU v Ashcroft (2004)-Case strikes Section 505 and can be appealed 
by the government.
Figure 6: Cases of the Patriot Era
Even in the case of Hamdi, where the government lost its ability to deny 
the Guantanamo detainees a trial and access to lawyers, the Court did not state 
how and under what authority the detainees must be tried. As it can be seen in 
the statement made by the Pentagon, in reference to the Court’s decision not 
being clear, and by the statement by Justice O’Connor in reference to the trial not 
having to be a civil trial, that a military tribunal would suffice, the case which took 
away power from the AUMF did so in a way that left its decision open to the 
government’s interpretation. The model fit the previous war eras because there 
was a definite enemy which the United States had declared war on. Having a 
definite enemy leads to having a definitive end to the war. This then allowed the 
“Expansion and Constriction” Model to carry out its course.
The following figure (Figure 7) shows the chart of the “Expansion and 
Constriction” Model when it was tried to be applied to the USA PATRIOT era.
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CHAPTER 4
ALICE SITS DOWN FOR BREAKFAST 
The USA PATRIOT Act has been seen as an attack on civil liberties. This 
is not an uncommon occurrence during times of war. In the past it has been 
shown that every war era has had such effects on civil liberties. The difference 
between the past war eras and the current, is the past wars were conventional 
wars and have ended. The current war is unconventional and there can be no 
end until the United States decides not to pursue its goal of having a war on 
“terror.” This means an indefinite suppression of civil liberties. The intent of this 
thesis was to show that a pattern of power shifting in the presidency occurred 
during times of war. The pattern, labeled the “Expansion and Constriction” 
Model, was then applied to cases of past wars to show validity. The model was 
then applied to the USA PATRIOT Act so that a prediction could be made. This 
chapter will answer four questions:
1. Does the “Expansion and Constriction” Model exist?
2. Can it be applied to the case of the USA PATRIOT Act?
3. What prediction can be made from the Model?
4. What future use, if any, exists?
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The “expansion and constriction” 
model tested
To test the “Expansion and Constriction” Model, cases were selected from 
eras of war in the United States. Each case was then broken down into the 
component parts that the “Expansion and Constriction” Model needed to function. 
Every war from the past eras, when fitted into the components, made the model 
valid. The pattern from war rising to the increased berth of presidential power to 
the subsequent readjustment of that power to near pre-wartime level, held up in 
testing.
The adjustment of power started with the introduction of hostilities and the 
readjustment of power began when the federal courts became involved. It is not 
the court decisions that make the component, but rather the court cases 
themselves. Having a court case at the federal level indicates that the nation is 
taking issue with one of the expanses of power the President had during the time 
of crisis. As the number of court cases at the federal level increased, more 
opinion towards the readjustment of power was shown, even dissents are found 
useful. The fact that the court cases exist is just as important as the outcome of 
the cases. Even if the government wins the court case, history has shown that 
eventually, through other means, the power of the President will be readjusted.
It has been shown that the court cases will sometimes be decided in the 
government’s favor and strengthen the President’s adjusted power, but 
eventually more cases will come into the USSC and the outcomes will start to 
favor the near readjustment of the President’s power back to pre-crisis times.
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The following figures are the resulting charts created showing the testing done to 
the “Expansion and Constriction” Model in the war eras of Chapter 2; (Figure 2, 
Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 5).
The charts listed above show that there is a predictable pattern which has 
been shown valid from the Civil War era to the Korean War era. A precedent of 
power adjustment of the presidency during crisis time exists. Can the precedent 
of the “Expansion and Constriction” Model be applied to the current situation with 
the USA PATRIOT Act?
Application of the “expansion andconstriction” 
model to Patriot era
The “Expansion and Constriction” Model had been successfully applied to 
the cases in Chapter 2; however, could it also be applied to the USA PATRIOT 
Act with equal success? In the past era cases, all of the components of the 
model have shown to have existed. The problem that occurred while trying to 
apply the “Expansion and Constriction” Model to the USA PATRIOT Act in 
Chapter 3 was due to the differences found in the case of the USA PATRIOT Act.
The components of the “Expansion and Constriction” Model as seen valid 
through the cases of the past eras are:
1 ) A Crisis which can be seen as a conventional war.
2) Power Given to the President
3) The Silence of the Courts
4) The Use of the Power Given to the President
5) Attack on Constitutional Rights of United States residents labeled as 
“enemy nation related”.
6) Complaint Filed at a Federal Court Level
7) The Crisis on the Downswing
98
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8) Federal Court Involvement
9) Readjustment of Power to President to a Lower Level
The details of the USA PATRIOT Act case do not lend themselves to fit 
into the components of the “Expansion and Constriction” Model as applied to the 
cases of Chapter 2. The USA PATRIOT Act’s case shows these components 
instead:
1 ) The Crisis not being a conventional war due to lack of definition of a 
conventional enemy which belongs to a nation.
2) Power Given to the President
3) The Silence of the Courts
4) The Use of the Power Given to the President
5) Attack on Constitutional Rights of United States residents labeled 
as “terrorists”
6) Complaint Filed at a Federal Court Level
7) The Crisis not on the downswing due to the lack of defining the 
enemy which the United States is fighting in conventional war 
terms.
8) Federal Court Involvement-stifled due to lack of definition of the 
“enemy nation”.
Reviewing Figure 5 and Figure 7 shows the main differences between the 
case of the USA PATRIOT Act era and the previous crisis cases is the lack of a 
conventional war being the main crisis and the use of the term “terrorist” instead 
of “enemy nation”. With those changes to the components, the crisis becomes 
perpetual and the “Expansion and Constriction” Model cannot be applied.
To make the “Expansion and Constriction” Model apply to the USA 
PATRIOT Act era, the word “terrorist” must be connected to a specific terrorist 
group. Currently there is a lack of a single group. This means there can be no 
end to the war since the enemy is not defined conventionally. The word 
“terrorist” may be defined as an ideological group that has declared war against 
the United States. Since the United States has not declared war on all forms of
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terrorism, such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), but rather a very specific 
group of terrorist, al-Qaeda, a definition of “enemy nation” can be given to that 
specific terrorist organization.
With this new definition of “terrorist” as “enemy nation”, the crisis becomes 
a conventional war which no longer is perpetual, but eventual, in ending. This, in 
turn, will let the “Expansion and Constriction” Model apply to the USA PATRIOT 
Act era, and a prediction of readjustment of power can be made.
With the new corrections to the USA PATRIOT Act case, the “Expansion 
and Constriction” Model fits and the chart for the Model appears as following 
(Figure 8):
ÆÊÊIÊ^
Pre-War /  ' ^
9-11 War on 
al-Qaeda 
terrorist Nat^n
Courts 
UndecidedUse ofPower
ViolationsDecrease y  
of Powepmow possible
/  with Conventional War
Unclear
Time
Action May 
Now be Clearer
Figure 8. New Chart for the Patriot Era
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Prediction
With the USA PATRIOT Act now having components that fit the 
“Expansion and Constriction” Model, precedent shows that the President’s 
powers will eventually readjust themselves to near pre-wartime levels. Currently 
there are only two major court cases that involve the USA PATRIOT Act. One 
case eventually affirms the government’s use of the USA PATRIOT Act and the 
other case calls a portion of the power given by the USA PATRIOT Act 
unconstitutional. If more federal cases on the USA PATRIOT Act are introduced, 
then the “Expansion and Constriction” Model shows that no matter the outcome 
of the cases, eventually a readjustment of power will occur. This is not to say that 
all of the powers granted by the USA PATRIOT Act will be taken away. Some of 
the power, such as the allowance of the FBI. CIA and local law enforcement to 
work jointly, is anticipated to remain. Some of the Act itself is only temporary and 
has an expiration date if not renewed. There is also the chance of the 
government using the structure of the USA PATRIOT Act to introduce new 
legislation but that is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Future use of the “expansion and 
constriction” model 
As stated in Chapter 1, there are two groups that have issue with the USA 
PATRIOT Act. One group wishes to maintain or increase the powers given 
through the USA PATRIOT Act, and the other group wishes to eliminate or
101
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
readjust the powers given by the USA PATRIOT Act. With the “Expansion and 
Constriction” Model, both groups can now formulate a successful plan of action.
If one were to want to increase or maintain the powers of the USA 
PATRIOT Act, then the need for an ongoing crisis arises. Only through a 
sustained crisis can the President maintain powers adjusted by the USA 
PATRIOT Act. To sustain the crisis of war, the term of “Terrorist” must remain 
vague and useable beyond the ideological group of al-Qaeda.
The other group wishes to readjust the powers given by the USA 
PATRIOT Act and can use the “Expansion and Constriction” Model to show that, 
through federal court involvement, and not through protesting, they can lead to 
the readjustment of power. Win or lose in the federal court system, the issue that 
this group tries to raise will be brought to the forefront of American politics and 
eventually will have the desired outcome of power readjustment.
One limitation of the current model is that the model does not take the 
personalities that make up the Congress, Supreme Court or the President in 
consideration. Future studies could be conducted to determine the effects 
personalities have on this model. This does not seem to effect the eventuality of 
readjustment, but rather the speed at which the readjustment occurs may be 
effected.
The readjustment has been shown in the past not to be an instant 
occurrence, but rather something which happens over a period of time; 
sometimes over generations. It has been shown in this thesis that, even though 
generations may pass, the power given through the USA PATRIOT Act will
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readjust to near pre-wartime levels. This conclusion has been called optimistic 
but, “like Alice, I like to believe three impossible things before breakfast." 
(Davidson, 1983, p. 74)
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